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LILLY V. VIRGINIA:
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND HEARSAY-
"OH WHAT A TANGLED WEB WE WEAVE ......
When Caesar reigned King at Rome,
Saint Paul was sent to hear his Doom,
But Roman Law in a criminal Case,
Must have the Accuser Face to Face,
Or Caesar gives a flat Denial-
But here's a Law made now of late;
Which destines Men to awful Fate
And Hangs and Damns without a Trial,
Which made me view all Nature through
To Find a Law where Men were ti'd,
By Legal Act which doth exact
Men's Lives before they're Try'd
Then down I took the sacred Book
And turn'd the Pages o'er
But could not find one of this kind
By God or Man before'
INTRODUCTION
The Confrontation Clause has a very long and colorful history.2
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution contains the
* "Oh what a tangled web we weave, When first we practise to deceive!" SIR WALTrER
SCOt-I, MARMION, Stanza 17 (1808).
1. JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW
YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664-1776) 446-47 & n.300 (1944) (discussing the
The Proceeding of the Convention of the Representatives of the New Hampshire Settlers attacking
a version of the English riot act passed by the New York legislature in 1774). The pamphlet
ended with the poem, and stated:
May it be considered that the legislative authority of the Province of New York had no
Constitutional right or power to make such Laws and consequently that they are Null
and Void from the Nature and Energy of the English Constitution therefore as they
merit no place among the laws of the Realm of Great Britain ....
Id. at 446.
2. For a historical background on how the Confrontation Clause developed and materialized
in the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, see Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Con-
frontation Clause. An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77 (1995). Professor Jonakait's arti-
cle focused on the right of confrontation as a grant of adversary power to the accused, and on an
alternative history of the Confrontation Clause and its placement in the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Id. at 81. Professor Jonakait argued that the origins of the Confron-
tation Clause were murky, but consistent with the historical record. It is likely that the English
abuse of the colonists was not the motivating reason behind the Clause. Id. at 80-82, 108-19.
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indoctrination of the federal Confrontation Clause in America, which
provides in part that a defendant in a criminal action has the right "to
be confronted with the witnesses against him."'3 As seen through case
history, the Supreme Court has found a defendant's right to confront
his accusers applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.4  The Court in Pointer v. Texas5 found that throughout the
years, both state and federal courts had emphasized cross-examination
as a necessity if the accused was to enjoy the right to a fair trial. 6
The Supreme Court's development of the Confrontation Clause be-
gan in earnest in 1895, with its decision in Mattox v. United States.7
Since that time, exceptions to the Confrontation Clause8 have virtu-
Furthermore, Professor Jonakait stated that the Supreme Court's premise, in Dutton v. Evans,
that the Clause has an ultimate goal of truth determination, was faulty: "Accurate trials [were]
not the driving force behind the Confrontation Clause and related provisions. The driving force
was to have trials in which the government's power was more constrained and the accused had
more opportunity to act in his own self-interest." Id. at 82, 168. See also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012. 1015-16 (1988), Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (acknowledging the derivation of the
Confrontation Clause).
3. The full text of the Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (finding that the right of the accused to
confront witnesses against him is a fundamental right, similar to the right to counsel and guaran-
tee against self-incrimination, and likewise is made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 404. The Court listed its past decisions that guarded the Confrontation Clause from
deterioration. Id. at 404-05. See also Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55-56 (1899) (referring
to the right of confrontation as so essential to the guarantee of life and liberty that the Constitu-
tion of the United States and the constitutions of most states have protected it from legislative
and judicial intervention); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931) (stating that cross-
examinination is "one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial"); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474, 496-97 (1959) (finding that the Court has been "zealous to protect these rights [confronta-
tion and cross-examination] from erosion").
7. 156 U.S. 237 (1895). The Court found that a transcribed copy of the reporter's stenographic
notes of two key prosecution witnesses' testimony, who were both examined and cross-examined
in a former trial but subsequently died, could be admitted into evidence against the defendant.
Id. at 240, 250.
8. The Court noted in Mattox that "general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in
their operation and valuable [sic] to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of
public policy and the necessities of the case." Id. at 243. The Court found that provisions of the
Bill of Rights are inherently subject to exceptions that are "intended to be respected." Id. The
Court stated that one such exception previously recognized is dying declarations that "from time
immemorial . . . have been treated as competent testimony, and no one would have the hardi-
hood at this day to question their admissibility." Id. at 243-44. See generally John G. Douglass,
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ally entwined procedural rights with hearsay 9 exceptions, which are
presently embodied in rules of evidence.' 0 The beginning of the inti-
mate relationship between hearsay and confrontation can be traced to
the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts,1I which articulated a
test that became the starting point for confrontation-hearsay analy-
sis.t2 This opinion announced that an unavailable declarant's state-
ment is admissible "only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability."" 3
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that an inference of reliability
could be made when the evidence "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception" or when there was a "showing of particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness."' 4 With the enunciation of this test by the Su-
preme Court, the Confrontation Clause, a constitutional procedural
right, was transformed into a rule of evidence. t 5
Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the Right to Confront
Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 201 (1999) (stating that the Court's dictum in Mattox
"signaled the basic shift that would dominate Confrontation Clause analysis a century later").
Professor Douglass noted that the Court bypassed an opportunity to articulate a right to im-
peach hearsay testimony as the defendant in Mattox proposed. Id. at 201 n.45. Douglass as-
serted that the failure of the Court to address this issue defined a pattern that it has never
broken. Id. Consequently, the Court's opinions since Mattox regarding the Confrontation
Clause have focused on the admissibility of prosecution evidence or hearsay statements. Id. To
support his hypothesis Douglass cited: White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Idaho v. Wright, 497
U.S. 805 (1990); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); and Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
9. The Supreme Court defined hearsay as "testimony in court, or written evidence, of a state-
ment made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters
asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter."
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 n.4 (1986). In the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay is defined
as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. Evil). 801(c).
10. See generally Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation
Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 607 (1992) (sug-
gesting the analysis of statements admissible under a hearsay exception to determine if they
conform to the Confrontation Clause). See also Douglass, supra note 8, at 196-97 (demonstrat-
ing how the Court continued to allow the law of evidence and the Confrontation Clause to
merge and contending that the defendant's confrontation right "is not to exclude the declarant's
unreliable testimony," but to impeach the declarant).
11. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
12. Douglass, supra note 8, at 203-06. Professor Douglass found that the Court completed its
transformation of confrontation to hearsay. Douglass stated that the "general approach" the
Court defined in Roberts turned reliability into a surrogate for cross-examination. Id. at 206. He
further contended that "[tihe Confrontation Clause is simply an exclusionary rule for unreliable
hearsay, and the law of evidence largely defines the rule." Id.
13. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. "Indicia of reliability" is the language that the Court took from its
prior decision in Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972). Id. at 65-66. The Court in Mancusi
cited the plurality in Dutton which defined "indicia of reliability" as a statement that is spontane-
ous and against the accused's best interest. Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 213.
14. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
15. See Douglass, supra note 8, at 205-06. Professor Douglass found that since the Roberts
decision "[rieliability has become the surrogate for cross-examination." Id. at 206.
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In 1999 the Supreme Court visited the confrontation-hearsay di-
chotomy in Lilly v. Virginia,1 6 a decision that would further confuse
and ameliorate future confrontation analysis. In Lilly, authorities ar-
rested Mark Lilly, his brother Benjamin Lee Lilly, and Gary Wayne
Barker after a two-day crime spree, which included the abduction and
murder of Alex DeFilippis.17 Upon being interrogated separately
from the others, Mark Lilly insisted, that while he participated in vari-
ous crimes during the spree, he was not the one who shot DeFilippis.1 8
Mark Lilly further stated that his brother, Ben Lilly, was the one who
murdered Defilippis.' 9 At Ben Lilly's trial, the state called Mark Lilly
as a witness, but he refused to testify and invoked his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. 20 Nonetheless, the Com-
monwealth of Virginia entered the statements of Mark Lilly into
evidence as declarations of a witness against Mark's penal interest, 21
and the court held that Mark Lilly's statements were admissible. 22
Subsequently, the jury convicted Ben Lilly of various charges, in-
cluding capital murder, and recommended the death penalty as man-
dated by the court.23 Ben Lilly appealed his conviction and asserted
that the declarations of Mark Lilly were inadmissible because they
were not against Mark's penal interest, and further, the admission vio-
lated his right to confrontation as articulated in the Sixth
Amendment. 24
The Confrontation Clause's salvation lies in redefining its parame-
ters and remaining a procedural right as other Sixth Amendment
rights remain intact.25 Although the text of the Confrontation Clause
16. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
17. Id. at 120.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 120-21.
20. /d. at 121.
21. To be a statement against penal interest, "the statement must be such 'that a reasonable
person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be
true.' in view of the statement's adversity to declarant's interest." JOH-N WILLIAM STi RONC., MC-
CORMICK ON EvIDENCE 344 (Practitioner Treatise Series, 4th ed. 1992).
22. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 121-22.
23. Id. at 122.
24. Id. at 123.
25. See generally Douglass, supra note 8, at 272 (proposing a broader notion of confrontation
to include an affirmative right to confront hearsay). Professor Douglas stated:
If creative and vigorous exercise of the right to confront hearsay can equip the jury with
adequate information for it to make a fair assessment of the out-of-court statement,
then the "hammer" of exclusion is unnecessary. The tool of confrontation, the one
written into the Sixth Amendment, will do the job.
Id. See also Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendmeni First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641 (1996). In




is clear in what it advocates, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence "is
surprisingly muddled in logic and exposition. '26 If left unfettered, the
dilution of the Confrontation Clause will effectively excise it from the
Sixth Amendment. As a result, it is up to the Court to provide a
means of analysis that is both consistent and sound.27
This Comment will analyze the history and development of the
Confrontation Clause culminating in its disjointed application by the
Supreme Court in Lilly v. Virginia. Part II will trace the history of the
Confrontation Clause and its growth in American criminal and consti-
tutional jurisprudence.28 In addition, Part II will explore the develop-
ment of the hearsay doctrine and how it has become intimately
connected to the right of confrontation. 29 Part III will discuss, in full,
the subject opinion of this Comment, notably Lilly v. Virginia.30 Part
IV will analyze two different categorical approaches suggested by
commentators, and endorsed by civil right groups such as the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), to correct imbalances in confron-
tation analysis. 31 Furthermore, Part IV will discuss the ACLU's
categorical approach, which was advocated in their amicus brief in
Lilly and the subject of Justice Stephen Breyer's concurring opinion,
as the most sensible means for attacking the inequities that have trans-
formed the Confrontation Clause from a procedural right to a rule of
evidence.32 Part IV will argue that the ACLU's categorical view is the
most plausible approach for the law to follow in order to establish
precedent that courts will be able to apply without forming additional
diluted decisions, such as those that have confused courts in the past,
or rendered the Confrontation Clause subordinate to hearsay excep-
The Sixth Amendment is the heartland of constitutional criminal procedure, yet the
legal community lacks a good map of its basic contours, a good sense of its underlying
ecosystem, a good plan for its careful cultivation. Amidst all the Amendment's tightly
configured clauses, scholars, lawyers, and judges have often lost their way. The result,
at times, has been bad constitutional law and bad criminal procedure.
Id. at 641.
26. Amar, supra note 25, at 690.
27. See generally Berger, supra note 10, at 588 (finding the right to confrontation interwoven
with the evolution of other protections and, combined, these guarantees were aimed at more
then just accurate fact-finding). See also Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation
Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 558 (1988) (examining the Confrontation
Clause and concluding that its interpretation is fundamentally different from other guarantees in
the Bill of Rights).
28. See infra notes 36-69 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 70-142 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 143-178 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes L79-242 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 243-248 and accompanying text.
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tions. 33 In conclusion, Part V will discuss the ACLU's approach, its
impact on future litigation and how its application will not disturb pre-
cedent established by the Supreme Court.3 4 Moreover, Part V will
suggest that Justice Stephen Breyer's opinion in Lilly opened the door
to future Confrontation Clause analysis centering on the utilization of
a categorical approach. 35
II. HISTORY OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND HEARSAY
Notwithstanding its questionable beginning, the controversy sur-
rounding the Confrontation Clause's origin is not a recent phenome-
non. 36 The Confrontation Clause can be traced throughout its early
history to its development and present application.
A. The Early History
The writings of the Hebrews, in the King James Bible, constitutes
one of the earliest known appearances of the right to confrontation. 37
History reveals that not only did the Hebrews endorse confrontation,
but that the Romans also required a similar approach to confrontation
rights. 38 However, in England the right to confrontation was recog-
nized with prestige, and for centuries the English practiced a form of
confrontation that required an open and face-to-face system, de-
scribed as an "altercation. ' 39 Prior to England's consistent use of con-
frontation in its legal arena, various judges and commentators praised
the English system over its continental counterpart. The English sys-
33. See infra notes 249-320 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 321-350 and accompanying text.
35. See infra note 351 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has discussed the origins of
the Confrontation Clause, and its guarantee of a face-to-face encounter, along with the strong
feelings, both in history and modern times, that people convey about the right. Coy, 487 U.S. at
1017. The Court relied on remarks by President Dwight D. Eisenhower to convey this senti-
ment. Id. President Eisenhower stated that in his hometown of Abilene, Kansas, if an individual
failed to confront a man and chose instead to talk behind his back, he would suffer a public
outrage. Id. at 1017-18. He analogized that in the entire United States it is the same principle,
and people must have the opportunity to meet their accusers face-to-face, because the accuser
,cannot hide behind the shadow." Id. at 1018.
37. The Hebrews required that the accused have the right to hear testimony from the wit-
nesses in the offender's presence. Deut. 19:15-18.
38. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015-16. The Book of Acts quotes the Roman Governor Festus as
proclaiming: "It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before the ac-
cused has met his accusers face-to-face, and has been given a chance to defend himself against
the charges." Acts 25:16.
39. Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 10ll,
1023 & n.66 (1998) (citing THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 114 (Mary Dewar ed.,
1982). "'Altercation" was the word used by Thomas Smith in the sixteenth century to describe
face-to-face confrontation. Id. at 1022-23.
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2001] LILLY v. VIRGINIA 1139
tem utilized the common law trial, as opposed to the continental sys-
tem which relied on witness testimony in the form of written questions
taken out of the presence of the offender.40
Nonetheless, the English did not always follow such a virtuous road
to confrontation. 41 For example, there were a variety of courts in En-
gland, including the Court of the Star Chamber, which followed the
continental system, rather then the English common law system.42
The Court of the Star Chamber welcomed volunteer witnesses, how-
ever, the party in opposition could not question them, in order to dis-
credit them, because it was believed that this would discourage
witnesses from coming forward. 43 Typically, the Court of the Star
Chamber employed torture to extort confessions or information from
the accused. 44 However, the use of these tactics by courts employing
Continental law led to political controversy over the system's tactics
and eventually caused its abolishment in the seventeenth century.45
The battle for confrontation rights was clearly fought in England
during the treason cases of the Tudor and Stuart eras, specifically that
of Sir Walter Raleigh. 46 The trial of Sir Walter Raleigh commenced in
1603 for his alleged crimes of conspiring to overthrow the King of
40. Id. at 1023 & n.68. Professor Friedman mentioned several authorities that discuss Athe-
nian procedure as well as European civil procedure that took written testimony out of court. Id.
at n.68. This practice led to fixed testimony that was simply brought in to the trial and confirmed
by the witness. Id.
41. See infra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
42. See 5 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 170-75 (2d ed. 1937).
Holdsworth listed various ways that common law and continental law were melded into the
procedure of the Court of Star Chamber. Id. at 184. Holdsworth noted that the "extraordinary"
measures that the Court of Star Chamber employed, which included torture and questioning
witnesses separately, made it different from common law and as such, the object of much criti-
cism. Id. at 184-86. Holdsworth further stated that:
[I]n the ordinary procedure of the court of Star Chamber we can see the influence both
of the common law and of the continental ideas. In the manner of pleading, in the open
hearing, in the liberty of defence, in the permission to employ counsel at all stages of
the proceedings, we see the influence of the common law. In the obligation of the
defendant to answer, and to submit to interrogatories on oath, in the secrecy of the
examination of both defendant and witnesses, and in the manner of hearing the case on
this written evidence we can see continental influences. But the ordinary procedure
was not the only procedure which the court used. For extraordinary cases extraordi-
nary methods of procedure must be employed; and it is in these extraordinary cases
that the analogy with continental methods becomes closer.
Id. at 184.
43. Id. at 182.
44. Id. at 184.
45. See Friedman, supra note 39, at 1024. Professor Friedman discussed other equity courts,
which employed the same tactics as the Star Chamber, such as relying on testimony taken out of
the presence of the accused, that survived, albeit without criminal jurisdiction. Id.
46. Kenneth W. Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh
Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 99-100 (1972). Professor Graham stated:
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England, altering religion and procuring enemies to invade the king-
dom. 47 The prosecution rested a majority of its case on interrogato-
ries and statements that others heard the principle witness, Sir Lord
Cobham, say to officers of the Crown. 48 Sir Walter Raleigh objected
to the use and admission of these statements at his trial and demanded
that he meet his accuser face-to-face. 49 However, the only witness
brought before him was a pilot who related a conversation that he had
with a fellow Englishman in Portugal. 50 The pilot testified that the
Englishman told him that Raleigh and Cobham were going to cut the
King's throat. 5'
Sir Walter Raleigh was not alone in his objection, as it was not un-
common for witnesses to escape testifying at trial during treason
cases. 52 The ability of witnesses to escape testifying in person ended
once defendants accused of treason became more aggressive in de-
manding that their accusers be brought before them.5 3
No one seems to have been able to write about the right [of confrontation] without
repeating the claim that the evils of the Raleigh trial led in some way to the Sixth
Amendment .... My research gives me no reason to suppose that this custom repre-
sents anything other than a convenient but highly romantic myth, and I adhere to it for
this reason.
Id. at 100 n.4.
47. Id. at 100 (noting that these charges would eventually cost Sir Walter Raleigh his head).
See also Berger, supra note 10, at 571 n.58 (citing 2 COMI'LETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS
AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AN1D MISDEMEANORS FROM THE
EARLIEST PERIoD To THE YEAR 1783 1, 16-17 (T.B. Howell ed., London, T.C. Hansard 1816)).
48. See Berger, supra note 10, at 571 (finding that "the prosecution relied almost exclusively
on witnesses testifying to statements that Cobham had made to officers of the Crown when they
examined him and on answers to interrogatories that Cobham had subscribed").
49. Id. See also Graham, supra note 46, at 100. Professor Graham wrote that Raleigh, though
not a lawyer or permitted counsel, eloquently demanded confrontation. Id. Raleigh stated:
"The proof of the Common Law is by witness and jury; let Cobham be here, let him speak it.
Call my accuser before my face, and I have done." Id. However, Officers of the Crown ob-
tained the document with Lord Cobham's confession that was used to support Raleigh's convic-
tion. This document was virtually the only piece of evidence used against Raleigh at trial;
although Raleigh was later able to show that Cobham had recanted. Id.
511. Graham, supra note 46, at 100-01.
51. Id. at 101. Even though this was a clear case of hearsay, that concept was not developed
until much later. Id. Raleigh, much ahead of his time, asked the court to look at the weight and
not the admissibility of the witnesses account. Id. He stated: "This is the saying of some wild
Jesuit or beggarly priest; but what proof is it against me?" Id. There was a consensus among
Raleigh's contemporaries that while none of the evidence proved that Raleigh was guilty, none-
theless, the court still convicted him. Id.
52. See Berger, supra note 10, at 571 & n.60 (citing MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME
PROCEEDINGS ON THE COMMISSION FOR THE TRIAL OF THE REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746, IN
THE COUNTY OF SURRY; AND OF OTHER CROWN CASES 234 (Michael Dodson ed., 3d ed.
1792).
53. This position was supported by statutes passed by Parliament. See Friedman, supra note
39, at 1024 & n.72 (citing Seymour's Case, I How. St. Tr. 483, 492 (1549) (demanding an open
trial and "accusers be brought face-to-face"): Duke of Somerset's Trial, 1 How. St. Tr. 515, 517,
1140
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Another major figure in the fight for democracy, and one of the
most vocal advocates for civil liberties in England during the seven-
teenth century, was John Lilburne. 54 Lilburne fought over forty years
for the proposition that "'the poorest he that is in England' was en-
dowed at birth with rights and privileges which his government,
whatever form it took, was powerless to invade." 55 Sir Walter Raleigh
and John Lilburne are only two men who fought for the civil rights of
many. Their efforts finally paid off when the long battle for the right
to confrontation was won, and there was no doubt that an offender's
rights included the right to meet his accusers face-to-face. 56
B. American History of the Confrontation Clause
Through a somewhat obscure process, the right of confrontation
found its way into American jurisprudence. 57 It was clear in England
520 (1551) (asking that witness[es] be brought "face-to-face"); Rex v. Rice ap Griffith, Lloyd and
Hughes (K.B. 1531), in 93 PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY, 1 THE REPORIS OF SIR
JOHN SPELMAN 47, 48 (J.H. Baker ed., 1976) (an accomplice admitted all acts face-to-face)).
Further, Professor Friedman discussed the statutes that demanded accusers be brought face-to-
face with a defendant. Id. at 1024 n. 73 (citing 1 Eliz. ch. 1, §21 (1558) ("requiring witnesses be
brought face-to-face with defendant before defendant arraigned or indicted"); 1 Eliz.. ch. 5, §10
(1558) ("requiring that witnesses be face-to-face with defendant, unless defendant confesses the
crime"); 13 Eliz., ch. 1, § 9 (1571); and 13 Car. 2, ch. 1, § 5 (1661)).
54. See generally Harold W. Wolfram, John Lilburne: Democracy's Pillar of Fire, 3 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 213 (1952) (providing an in-depth discussion of John Lilburne's impact and influence on
English history and the struggle for civil liberties).
55. Id. at 214. John Lilburne was a champion of civil liberties, advocating that the government
should allow the deposed King of England a trial by jury. Id.
56. Id. In regard to John Lilburne. Wolfram wrote:
Lilburne's stubborn persistence received ample official recognition. He was dragged
before the bar of justice time after time, stood trial for his life on four separate occa-
sions, endured confiscation of his property and indignities to his person, spent most of
his adult life in foul English jails and suffered banishment from his native land ....
And all of us, to a greater or lesser extent, as we value or disdain freedom of speech,
freedom of press, and the procedural safeguards for which he fought, are the benefi-
ciaries of this "obstreperous and forward" individual and his stubborn espousal of
novelties.
Id. at 214-15. See also Friedman, supra note 39. at 1024 n.74. Professor Friedman discussed
Lilburne's 1649 trial:
By the time of John Lilburne's trial in 1649, there seemed to be no doubt that the
witnesses would testify live in front of Lilburne; "hear what the witnesses say first," said
the presiding judge in postponing one of Lilburne's arguments. When the witness did
testify, Lilburne was allowed to pose questions for them, but only through the court:
"you must make your question to us, and require us to ask him the question: and then if
your question be fair, it shall not be denied you." Lilburne purported to accept this
restriction, though sometimes, perhaps impulsively, he failed to comply with it. And,
though the court was quite restrictive, he did get answers to some of his questions.
Id. (citations omitted).
57. See Jonakait, supra note 2 and accompanying text. Professor Jonakait noted that there is
scholarly debate on exactly how much impact common law had on colonial law (citing WIIAM
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that the right to confrontation constituted a way for citizens to dimin-
ish inquisitorial control by the Crown.58 Consequently, the colonists
brought this mentality with them when settling the American colonies.
In fact, it was not long after the establishment of the colonies that
Massachusetts enacted a statute that stated "in all capital cases all wit-
nesses shall be present wheresoever they dwell."' 59 There is doubt as
to whether the colonists relied on the events of the seventeenth cen-
tury, such as Sir Walter Raleigh's trial, to form the basis of their con-
frontation rights.60 However, it is clear that the lawyers from England
brought with them the knowledge of the procedural modifications in
trials enacted in England after the Glorious Revolution of 1688.61
M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT To COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 9 (1955)). Id. at 83 n.24 & 112
n.171. See also Berger, supra note 10, at 567-86 (finding that the colonists certainly knew of the
historical developments in England regarding criminal procedure); Douglass, supra note 8, at
234-40 (finding that the Framers were aware of a history of struggle to resist inquisitorial proce-
dures); Cathleen J. Cinella, Note, Compromising the Sixth Amendment Right To Confrontation-
United States v. Gigante, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 135, 141-143 (1998) (finding that although the
drafters of the Constitution did not explicitly provide for "face-to-face" confrontation, early Su-
preme Court decisions found it inherent in the right to confrontation); But see California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174-75 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding that "[tihe Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment is not one that we may assume the Framers understood as the
embodiment of settled usage at common law").
58. See Berger, supra note 10, at 577 (finding that the abolition of the Star Chamber, the
strengthening of the role of the jury, and newly passed legislation after the Glorious Revolution
confirmed that confrontation emerged as part of a procedural package).
59. The Book Of The General Lauues And Libertyes Concerning The Inhabitants Of Massa-
chusetts 54 (1648), in I THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETrS 1641-1691 54 (John D.
Cushing ed., 1976).
60. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 46, at 104 n.23 (finding that the Sixth Amendment was prob-
ably a reaction to the vice-admiralty courts and not the fate of Raleigh or the abuses of the Star
Chamber); Murl A. Larkin, The Right of Confrontation: What Next? I TEX. TECH. L. REV. 67, 70
(1969). Professor Larkin found that the Leveller pamphlets, which advocated the levelling of all
ranks and the establishment of a more democratic government, printed in the mid-seventeenth
century in England, were the most influential in the colonies. Id. at 70. However, several view-
points exist suggesting that Sir Walter Raleigh's trial led directly to the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment. See White, 502 U.S. at 360-61 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (finding
that the Supreme Court had, in the past, based the common law origins of the right to confronta-
tion on abuses, such as Sir Walter Raleigh's trial, in England during the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries); FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT To THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITEl) STATES 104-05 (1951) (granting the accused the right to be confronted with wit-
nesses against him "was a common law right which had gained recognition as a result of the
abuses in the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh"); Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause
and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L.
REV. 691, 717 (1993) (discussing crucial role of Raleigh's treason trial in development of Sixth
Amendment confrontation rights).
61. See Berger, supra note 10, at 580. Professor Berger discussed the Glorious Revolution
and the American colonists' optimism toward obtaining liberty through the granting of rights to
members of the community. Id. After the Glorious Revolution, which was a struggle to
strengthen the rights of citizens resulting in the ousting of the Stuarts in England, many lawyers
came to the American colonies and presented new reforms to the criminal justice system; for the
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Furthermore, by 1719, publications in the colonies that described tri-
als, such as Sir Walter Raleigh's trial, affirmed that the colonists were
aware of the Crown's attempt to oppress civil liberties in England. 62
The colonists felt their own brand of oppression when, in the 1760s,
Parliament imposed upon them intolerable laws such as the Stamp
Act of 1765.63
The colonist's battle with Parliament and the Crown, in addition to
the inquisitorial battle fought in England concerning the right to con-
frontation, influenced the Framers of the Bill of Rights. 64 However,
the American approach to the right of confrontation did not solely
draw on English law, as there were other influences that helped to
shape the rules of criminal procedure. 65  In addition, the colonists
colonists, these reforms were associated with greater freedom. Id. at 581 n. 99 (citing HELLER,
supra note 60, at 20).
62. See 12 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HisTrORY OF ENGLISH LAW 127-30 (2d ed. 1938)
(compiling a list of publications that included various accounts of state trials).
63. See Berger, supra note 10, at 579. The Stamp Act was an inquisitorial measure by England
to control the American colonists. Id. at 579. Professor Berger stated:
In 1765 the Stamp Act enlarged the jurisdiction of the vice-admiralty courts, allowing
them to sit without juries and to examine the witnesses in chambers upon interrogato-
ries. Shortly thereafter Parliament resolved that all colonial traitors would be tried in
England-thereby depriving them of a jury from the vicinage, the ability to call witnesses
on their behalf, and virtually ensuring that the Crown's evidence would be in the form
of depositions. Viewed against the backdrop of increasing knowledge about English
criminal procedure and the gains of the Glorious Revolution, this reversion to inquisi-
torial procedures may have struck the colonists as a step backwards.
Id. Professor Berger also discussed the highly publicized trial of John Hancock in 1768, who had
been sued in Admiralty by the advocate general for the alleged smuggling of wine. Id. at 579 n.
94. John Adams represented him and wrote extensively about the controversial and much hated
civil law interrogatories. Id.
64. See Berger, supra note 10, at 579-80. Professor Berger stated:
To the colonists, the evolution of the common law in the period from Magna Carta to
the Glorious Revolution recorded the successful struggle to strengthen the rights of
citizens vis-A-vis the Crown. It provided the colonists, and hence the framers, with an
explanation of how England had ultimately arrived at a "constitution" capable of pre-
serving liberty by securing rights to different members of the community.
Id. at 580.
65. For an interesting view on how major trials in America shaped criminal procedure juris-
prudence, see Jonakait, supra note 2, at 124-64. Professor Jonakait, in an attempt to support his
proposition that the Confrontation Clause constitutionalized procedures already used in the
states, discussed several different occurrences that he believed shaped the colonists' view of
criminal procedure. Id. at 112, 124. Some of these events included the Salem Witch Trials, the
Boston Massacre Trials, the New York Slave Revolt Trials of 1741, and the Trial of Levi Weeks.
Id. at 126-64. Professor Jonakait found that the Salem Witch Trials expressed the "dangers in a
system where the accused could do little to affect the factual developments that occurred at
trial." Id. at 135-36. Critics of the Salem Witch Trials found that a fair trial required an advocate
for the defense who could conduct meaningful cross-examination. Id. at 136. The Boston Mas-
sacre Trials moved Massachusetts toward a true adversarial system that included representation
by an attorney for the accused, a right to present a defense through cross-examination, and the
right to present witnesses. Id. The New York Slave Revolt Trials of 1741 were examples of trials
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often relied on Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of
England, with the intent of including its contents in their rules of crim-
inal procedure. 66
Blackstone discussed the advantages of the English system requir-
ing oral testimony in open court by stating the following:
This open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all
mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of truth, than
the private and secret examination taken down in writing before an
officer, or his clerk, in the ecclesiastical courts, and all others that
have borrowed their practice from the civil law: where a witness
may frequently depose that in private, which he will be ashamed to
testify in a public and solemn tribunal. There an artful or careless
scribe may make a witness speak what he never meant, by dressing
up his depositions in his own forms and language; but he is here at
liberty to correct and explain his meaning, if misunderstood, which
he can never do after a written deposition is once taken. Besides,
the occasional questions of the judge, the jury, and the counsel, pro-
pounded to the witnesses on a sudden, will sift out the truth much
better than a formal set of interrogatories previously penned and
settled; and the confronting of adverse witnesses is also another op-
portunity of obtaining a clear discovery, which can never be had
upon any other method of trial .... In short, by this method of
examination, and this only, the persons who are to decide upon the
evidence have an opportunity of observing the quality, age, educa-
tion, understanding, behaviour, and inclinations of the witness; in
which points all persons must appear alike, when their depositions
are reduced to writing, and read to the judge, in the absence of
those who made them; and yet as much may be frequently collected
from the manner in which the evidence is delivered, as from the
matter of it. 67
where the defense had been granted peremptory jury challenges, cross-examination of witnesses,
and the right to call witnesses. Id. at 146-48. However, during the New York Slave Revolt Trials,
the defendants did not have lawyers, so the rights they were granted were meaningless. Yet,
Professor Jonakait posits that these events may have spurred New York to move to a system in
which defense attorneys were essential. Id. at 147, 154. Finally, it was clear that by the time of
the Levi Weeks trial, in 1800, where the jury returned a verdict of not guilty within five minutes,
"New York criminal procedure had been transformed." Id. at 163. This was a system dependent
on defense advocacy and making prosecutors prove their case. Id. at 155, 163.
66. See Berger, supra note 10, at 581-82 (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AM-RICAN LAW 102 (2d ed. 1985)). Friedman recounted that in colonial history, a lawyer's
library was full of books on English law and not American law, however:
When Blackstone's Commentaries were published (1765-69), Americans were his most
avid customers. At last there was an up-to-date shortcut to the basic themes of English
law. An American edition was printed in 1771-72, on a subscription basis, for sixteen
dollars a set; 840 American subscribers ordered 1,557 sets-an astounding response.
Id. at 581 n.102.




Blackstone discussed the role of confrontation as it related to the role
of the jury, which he and the Framers of the Bill of Rights believed
was the principle safeguard of the people's liberties. 68 Eight different
colonies eventually adopted the idea of a Confrontation Clause into
bills declaring their state's rights and eventually, the Confrontation
Clause became one of the procedural rights protected by the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
69
C. How Hearsay Fits Into the Web of the Confrontation Clause
During the early evolution of the Confrontation Clause, reliability7 °
of the witnesses' statements was not tied to the procedural right of
confrontation.7 1 In fact, it was unheard of that an accused would
loose his right to confront his accuser simply because the evidence was
reliable.7 2 The idea that the reliability of a witness' statement could
excuse an accused's right to confrontation is important since, in Ohio
v. Roberts, it was a factor in deciding whether an unavailable declar-
ant's statement was admissible. 73 Deciding whether an accused has
the right to confront his accuser, by using the subjective test of
whether a witness' statement is reliable, brought rebuke from Justice
Antonin Scalia who commented that, "the Confrontation Clause does
not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees specific trial procedures
that were thought to assure reliable evidence, undeniably among
which was 'face-to-face' confrontation. '74 Justice Scalia's reasoning
mirrors what commentators such as Blackstone contemplated when
writing about confrontation analysis. 75
68. See Berger, supra note 10, at 583-84 (finding that Blackstone's Commentaries "demon-
strate no concern with the law of evidence even though this area of the law was in the midst of
change").
69. See id. at 584-85. Professor Berger noted that although there is very little legislative his-
tory that exists concerning the eight colonies' inclusion of a Confrontation Clause, the anti-fed-
eralist debate, which protested the lack of a federal Bill of Rights, indicated that the right to
confrontation, along with other procedural rights, was viewed as a whole with the right to trial by
jury as a necessary safeguard against government abuse. Id.
70. For an extended discussion of the term "reliability" see Richard D. Friedman, Confronta-
tion and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 ISR. L. REV. 506, 511-13 (1997). Professor Friedman con-
tends that reliability is an inappropriate standard for measuring the confrontation right. Id. at
512. Furthermore, reliability "does not respond to the underlying concerns that make the con-
frontation right fundamental." Id.
71. Brief for Petitioner at 12, Lilly v. Virginia. 527 U.S. 116 (1999) [hereinafter Brief for
Petitioner].
72. Id.
73. 448 U.S. 65-66 (1980).
74. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 67. at *373.
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1. John Henry Wigmore
A tremendous influence on the Supreme Court's jurisprudence con-
cerning confrontation analysis and rules of hearsay was John H. Wig-
more. 76 According to one commentator, Wigmore brought forth the
concept that
[e]vidence that meets a hearsay exception also passes Confrontation
Clause muster because a hearsay exception guarantees that cross-
examination is not needed, and the right of confrontation is identi-
cal with the right to cross-examination. Consequently the admission
of evidence that satisfies a hearsay exception does not impair the
Confrontation Clause's truth-seeking mission, which Wigmore as-
sumed was the only function of the Confrontation Clause. 77
Wigmore claimed that the hearsay rule was well established by the
early 1700s, however, there is skepticism surrounding this theory.78
Today, many commentators believe that the hearsay rule was not fully
developed until the late 1700s. Further supporting this belief is the
fact that not until 1794, over one hundred years after the introduction
of the right to confrontation in America, the general and abstract
76. 5 JOHN H. WIoMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS Ar COMMON LAW (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)
[hereinafter WIGMORE]. The Federal Rules of Evidence were not enacted until 1975, however:
The common law of hearsay for the first three-quarters of this century is best reflected
in-and was profoundly influenced by-Wigmore's monumental treatise on evidence.
Wigmore published three editions of this treatise between 1904 and 1940. The portions
dealing principally with hearsay were revised by James Chadbourn in the 1970s and are
contained in volumes four through six of the revised edition.
Friedman, supra note 39, at 1014 n.12.
77. Berger, supra note 10, at 592; see also WIGMORE, supra note 76, §1395 at 150. Wigmore
found that the process of confrontation has two purposes, the main and essential purpose was to
secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. Id. The secondary and dispensa-
ble purpose was that the judge and jury have the opportunity to watch the witness' demeanor
while testifying. Id. at 153.
78. WIGMORE, supra note 76, §1395 at 150: see also John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial
Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI L. REV. 263 (1978). Professor Langbein posited that, even as late
as the 1730s, judges knew that there was something wrong with hearsay, but could not decide
between exclusion or admissibility with diminished credit. Id. at 302; see also Stephan Lands-
man, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 497 (199)). Professor Landsman wrote:
During the course of the 1700's, judges came to recognize the dangers of hearsay. The
problem was met by the eventual development of a rather strict rule of exclusion. That
rule became ever more formal, and both counsel and the court were increasingly likely
to insist on its enforcement. The hearsay rule generally worked to compel the produc-
tion of live testimony. In this way it increased the opportunities for contentious exami-
nation. It also served as a tool that counsel might manipulate in pursuing a client's
interests .... ITihe growth of the hearsay rule came in three stages. In the earliest
years of the century there was little concern about the use of out-of-court words. By
the 1730s, the rudiments of the hearsay rule were established and at least sporadically
applied. By the closing decades of the century a more sophisticated rule had been
developed and was being applied in a constantly broadening range of cases.
Id. at 572.
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rules of evidence, including the rule of hearsay, were addressed in En-
gland's House of Commons.79
In the course of his studies, Wigmore found an interrelationship be-
tween cross-examination and confrontation. In addition, Wigmore be-
lieved that when hearsay was sufficiently reliable, it excused the
declarant from testifying. 0 Wigmore further contended that confron-
tation concerned truth-seeking and did not operate independently of
the hearsay rule in a case regarding out of court statements. 81 Exam-
ining Wigmore's theories, and comparing them to the Supreme
Court's concern about reliability, it is likely that Wigmore significantly
influenced the Supreme Court's present day view of confrontation as
an evidentiary doctrine.82
79. John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder
Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1188 (1996). Professor Langbein quoted Edmund Burke as
remarking to the House of Commons that "the law of evidence ... [was] very general, very
abstract, and comprised in so small a compass that a parrot he had known might get them by rote
in one half hour, and repeat them in five minutes." Id.; see also Lilly, 527 U.S. at 140 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("[Tihe Confrontation Clause itself has ancient origins that predate the hearsay rule
..... ); Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926) (stating that the right of confrontation
was a common-law right having recognized exceptions and did not originate with the provision
in the Sixth Amendment). Justice Breyer, in Lilly, listed a variety of sources indicating the right
of confrontation's ancient roots and stated : "The right of an accused to meet his accusers face-
to-face is mentioned in, among other things, the Bible, Shakespeare, and 16th and 17th century
British statutes, cases and treatises." Lilly, 527 U.S. at 140-41. Justice Breyer's list included:
THE BIBLE, Acts 25:16; WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II, act I, sc. 1; WILLIAM SHAKE-
SPEARE, HENRY VIII, act II, sc. 1; 30 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE §6342, at 227 (1997) (quoting statutes enacted under King Edward VI in 1552 and Queen
Elizabeth I in 1558); cf. Case of Thomas Tong, Kelyng J. 17, 18, 84 Eng. Rep. 1061, 1062 (1662)
(finding that out-of-court confession may be used against the confessor, but not against co-con-
spirators); SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 163-164 (C. Gray
ed. 1971); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 373. See also supra notes 2, 36-38 and
accompanying text.
80. Berger, supra note 10, at 572. Wigmore insisted that:
There never was at common law any recognized right to an indispensable thing called
confrontation as distinguished from cross-examination. There was a right to cross-ex-
amination as indispensable, and that right was involved in and secured by confronta-
tion; it was the same right under different names .... It follows that, if the accused has
had the benefit of cross-examination, he has had the very privilege secured to him by
the Constitution .... Moreover, this right of cross-examination thus secured was not a
right devoid of exceptions.
WIGMORE, supra note 76, at 158-59 (emphasis in original).
81. See Berger, supra note 10, at 572.
82. See id. at 592. Professor Berger noted that Wigmore's effect on the teaching of evidence
and acceptance of his theory by both commentators and courts has been widely chronicled. Id.
at 592 n.143 (citing Graham, supra note 46, at 104; Howard W. Gutman, Academic Determinism:
The Division of the Bill of Rights, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 295, 327-43 (1981); Larkin, supra note 60, at
68-70); see also supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
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However, the rule of hearsay provides that statements which cannot
be tested, should not be used to prove the truth of that statement. 83
Thus, contrary to Wigmore, the hearsay doctrine differs in multiple
ways from the Confrontation Clause.84 First, the evidentiary rule of
hearsay is concerned with the admissibility of evidence; while confron-
tation, a constitutional right, concerns itself with the process by which
the accused may confront the declarant of an out of court statement. 85
Second, the hearsay rule is fraught with exceptions while the Confron-
tation Clause, as expressly written in the Sixth Amendment, is not
subject to such exceptions. 86 However, although these doctrines seem
to appear different on the surface, the desire of the courts to connect
the two has infiltrated a myriad of cases that continue to cause confu-
sion among the lower courts.87
83. See FEi3. R. Evil). 801(c).
84. See Friedman, supra note 39, at 1014-15. Professor Friedman listed several cases that
demonstrate the Court's attempt to distinguish between hearsay and confrontation, they in-
cluded: United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 393 n.5 (1986) (noting that hearsay and confronta-
tion do not completely overlap); Dutton, 400 U.S. at 80-81 (stating that the Court has never
equated the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule and therefore refused to do so in this
opinion). In California v. Green the Court noted that "[w]hile it may readily be conceded that
hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is
quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause
is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they
existed historically at common law." 399 U.S. at 155-56. Professor Friedman listed Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-82 (1987), White, 502 U.S. at 353, and Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66
as recent cases where the Court melded hearsay and confrontation. See Friedman, supra note
39. at 1014 n.15.
85. See Douglass, supra note 8, at 199. Professor Douglas wrote:
ITihe temptation to merge the two has always been great. After all, they both address
the same evil: trial by absent, untested witnesses. As Justice Harlan once commented,
it is "not unnatural" to assume that they both should employ the same method-exclu-
sion of unreliable hearsay-to combat a common enemy. The Court has not been able
to avoid that temptation. This "exclusionary thinking" under the Confrontation Clause
began in the Court's first hearsay/confrontation cases.
Id. at 199. Professor Douglass expanded on Justice Harlan's concurrence in Dutton v. Evans.
Douglass. supra note 8. at 199 n.31. Professor Douglass noted that the concurrence by Justice
Harlan was the first time a member of the Supreme Court argued that courts should not apply
the Confrontation Clause as a rule excluding hearsay. Id.
86. Id. at 199.
87. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 182-83. The Court discussed the statements of the co-conspira-
tors and found that the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule was firmly rooted in criminal
jurisprudence starting with the case of United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 460 (1827).
Id. at 183. Therefore, the Court believed there was no need for an independent investigation of
the reliability of the statement, and thus, no need for a separate challenge to the out-of-court
statement by the co-conspirator based on the Confrontation Clause. Id. For the Court's "gen-
eral approach" to confrontation analysis see supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
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2. Mattox v. United States
In 1895, the Supreme Court decided Mattox v. United States,8 8 and
looked for the first time at the Confrontation Clause as it pertained to
challenges against the admissibility of hearsay.8 9 The defendant in
Mattox was convicted of murder by the United States District Court of
Kansas. The defendant subsequently appealed the decision directly to
the United States Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded for a
new trial.90 The second trial ended in a hung jury, which resulted in a
third trial where the jury found Mattox guilty and condemned him to
death. 91 Prior to the third trial, Thomas Whitman and George Thorn-
ton, two of the state's witnesses, had died; yet the court admitted into
evidence the dead witnesses' testimony which had been recorded by a
stenographer at the two previous trials. 92 The defendant objected to
this admission, citing the Confrontation Clause as a clear procedural
right, which dictated that the admissibility of prior testimony was
unconstitutional. 93
The Supreme Court never mentioned hearsay, but rather, exten-
sively discussed the Confrontation Clause and its historical primary
objective "to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits ... [from] be-
ing used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and
cross-examination of the witness . . . . -94 The Supreme Court dis-
agreed with Mattox and found that "general rules of law of this kind
[confrontation], however beneficent in their operation and valuable to
the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public
policy and the necessities of the case."'95 The Court further found that
multiple provisions of the Constitution are subject to respected pre-
88. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
89. Id. at 242-45.
90. Id. at 251. The first trial ended with a conviction for Mattox in the 1891 September term.
Id.
91. Id. Mattox was tried for the third time in the 1893 December term, and he, for the second
time, presented a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242; see also Brief for Petitioner at 13. The ACLU's brief stated:
It is noteworthy that the word hearsay appears neither in Mattox v. United States, the
first of several cases to note that the "primary object" of the Clause was to prevent the
use of testimony taken ex parte, nor in Pointer v. Texas, which held that the Clause
expresses a fundamental right applicable against the states. As its language plainly
indicates, the Clause was not an attempt to constitutionalize the nascent law of hearsay.
Rather, it plainly expressed the fundamental principle that if a person acts as a witness
against an accused, the accused must have the opportunity to confront that person.
Id.
95. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
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existing exceptions and do not interfere with the spirit of the law.96
The Court recited one exception as the admission of dying
declarations:
They [dying declarations] are rarely made in the presence of the
accused; they are made without any opportunity for examination or
cross-examination, nor is the witness brought face to face with the
jury; yet from time immemorial they have been treated as compe-
tent testimony, and no one would have the hardihood at this day to
question their admissibility. They are admitted, not in conformity
with any general rule regarding the admission of testimony, but as
an exception to such rules, simply from the necessities of the case,
and to prevent a manifest failure of justice.97
Although the Court found that Mattox's rights had not been infringed
since the defendant had adequate opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses in the previous trial, the Court had carved out an exception
to the Confrontation Clause and virtually equated that exception to
dying declarations.98 Therefore, the Court went beyond the narrow
holding that prior cross-examination satisfied the procedural right
found in the Confrontation Clause and implicitly connected that pro-
cedural right to a rule of evidence. 99 The Court drew an analogy be-
tween prior testimony given under oath and subject to cross-
examination, and dying declarations, which are not subject to cross-
examination, because the Court believed that dying declarations were
as "reliable" as cross-examination given under oath.100
An opposing view is that if hearsay and the right to confrontation
are superimposed to mean the same thing, "[a]dmissibility of hearsay
would become an all-or-nothing issue" because procedural rights pro-
tected by the Confrontation Clause would not apply to cases such as
dying declarations, constituting an "exception" to the right of confron-
tation.""° It is this tension between hearsay and the right to confronta-
tion that would dominate the Court's confrontation-hearsay analysis
in future cases. 0 2
For the better part of a century, the Court did not confront the "re-
liability" theme of Mattox.103 Instead, the Court strictly applied the
96. Id.
97. Id. at 243-44.
98. See Douglass, supra note 8, at 200-01. See also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (stating that "[i]n
a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant
while believing that the declarant's death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances
of what the declarant believed to be impending death" is not excluded by the hearsay rule).




103. id. at 202.
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"procedural rights" of the Mattox holding to the cases brought before
it.104 For example, in 1970, the Supreme Court decided Dutton v. Ev-
ans.105 In Dutton, the state successfully convicted the defendant, Alex
Evans, of murder partially based on an informant's testimony that
concerned statements made by Evans' accomplice, Venson Wil-
liams.106 Williams never testified, nor was he subject to cross-exami-
nation.'0 7 In deciding Dutton, Justice Potter Stewart conceded that, in
the past, the Court had recognized that hearsay rules and the Con-
frontation Clause protect similar values, but on more than one occa-
sion, the Court has found a violation of the Confrontation Clause
even though a lower court admitted the statements under a recog-
nized hearsay exception. 108 Justice Stewart analyzed the informant's
statement and found that it was both spontaneous and against his pe-
nal interest. 10 9 Subsequently, Justice Stewart found that these two ele-
ments, when specifically advanced by an informant, were "indicia of
reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether
a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confron-
tation of the declarant." 1" The Court used Dutton v. Evans as a basis
for a Confrontation Clause decision, which based the admissibility of
hearsay on the "reliability" of the hearsay statement and not the pro-
cedural right of confrontation."'
3. Ohio v. Roberts, White v. Illinois, and Lee v. Illinois
In Ohio v. Roberts,112 the United States Supreme Court came full
circle to its decision in Mattox and refined the theme of allowing hear-
say exceptions to trump the right of confrontation. 1 3 The Court ac-
knowledged that historical evidence, regarding the procedural usage
of the right to confrontation, left little doubt as to the intent of the
Confrontation Clause and whether it was to exclude hearsay. 1  In
addition, the Court noticed a preference for face-to-face confrontation
104. Id. See e.g., Mancusi, 408 U.S. 204; Green, 399 U.S. 149: Pointer, 380 U.S. 400.
105. See Douglass supra note 8, at 202 (recognizing Dutton as the only case in the 1960s or
1970s in which the Court's opinion did not deal with hearsay testimony from judicial
proceedings).
106. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 77-78.
107. Id. at 78.
108. Id. at 81-82.
109. Id. at 89.
110. Id.
111. Douglass, supra note 8, at 203 n.55.
112. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
113. In Roberts, the Court articulated a test that would dominate Confrontation Clause analy-
sis. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; Douglass, supra note 8, at 205.
114. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
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at trial. The Court stated that "a primary interest secured by [the
Confrontation Clause] is the right of cross-examination" and further
articulated a "general approach" to Confrontation Clause analysis.1 15
The Court found that when analyzing a confrontation problem, two
distinct elements should be considered in deciding whether to restrict
admissible hearsay.' 16 The first element dictated a finding that a rule
of necessity was essential to conform to the Framer's preference for
face-to-face accusation. 117 This rule of necessity dictated that the
prosecution either produce or show the unavailability of the declarant
whose statement it wished to introduce into evidence. 1 8 The second
element required proof, or an examination, of whether the declarant
was unavailable.' 19 If the declarant was proven to be unavailable by
the prosecution, then his prior testimony must, to be entered into evi-
dence, have sufficient "indicia of reliability."'' 20 The Court ended its
analysis by concluding that "reliability can be inferred without more
in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent
a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."' 21
Thus, to have admissible hearsay and avoid a confrontation prob-
lem the declarant must be unavailable, and the evidence must have
sufficient "indicia of reliability.' 122 To have sufficient "indicia of relia-
bility," the evidence must fall within a firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion, or absent that, the evidence must show particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness. Thus, the right to cross-examination became an
"indicia of reliability" that made hearsay admissible, rather then the
primary objective of the Confrontation Clause. 123 Inevitably, the
Court used this two-pronged "general approach" in determining the
115. Id. at 63, 65 (citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)).
116. Id. at 65.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 66.
120. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
121. Id. The Court identified a number of commentators who had recently written on the
reconciliation of confrontation and hearsay. Id. at 66 n.9. The Court found that there was not a
single commentary suggesting that the Court had misidentified the basic interests of the accused,
nor was there any commentary that had shown their analysis was out of line with the intention of
the Framers. Id. Based on the fact that the Court was not apprised of any logical alternative to
their line of jurisprudence, they rejected the notion that they should, in effect, alter prior deci-
sions by adopting an alternative proposal. Id. The Court determined that their "middle of the
road" approach was both successful and appropriate. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Douglass, supra note 8, at 21)4-05.
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admissibility of hearsay statements, and therefore, the procedural
right of confrontation became a rule of evidence.124
Although the Supreme Court found that the use of its two-pronged
"general approach" was a "middle-of-the-road" adaptation of hearsay
and confrontation, the Court virtually abandoned the "rule of neces-
sity" prong of the analysis used in United States v. Inadi.12 5 In Inadi,
the Court ruled that the admissibility of a co-conspirator's statements
did not depend on the availability of the declarant. 126 Moreover, the
Court refused to apply an "unavailability requirement," which was
similar to the Court's decision to not apply the "unavailability require-
ment" in White v. Illinois.127
In White, the defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual
assault, residential burglary, and unlawful restraint. 12 8 On appeal, the
Supreme Court held that the prosecution was not required to produce
the four year-old victim at trial and, furthermore, that they did not
have to prove that the child was unavailable in order for her testimony
to be admitted into evidence. 29 The Court determined that the girl's
statements properly fell within the hearsay exceptions for excited ut-
terances and statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment.130
While the Court in Roberts proclaimed a "general unavailability"
requirement, it only applied the requirement to prior testimony. 13'
124. See Douglass, supra note 8, at 206. See e.g., White, 502 U.S. at 355-56 (finding spontane-
ous declarations and statements made for purposes of medical treatment are made in contexts
that provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness). The Court noted that "[t]here can
be no doubt that the two exceptions we consider in this case are "firmly rooted." Id. at 356 n.8.
It found that the exception for spontaneous declarations was at least two centuries old, recog-
nized by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and accepted by nearly four-fifths of the states. id.
Similarly, the Court found that the exception for statements made for purposes of medical treat-
ment was recognized in the Federal Rules of Evidence and equally accepted by the States. Id.
See also Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183 (finding that co-conspirators statements are "firmly rooted"
hearsay exceptions and "steeped in our jurisprudence"). See also Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197,
1205 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that "[slince Roberts was announced, federal appellate courts have
marched in near-perfect unison to the Roberts tune"). Cf. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 392-94 (finding
"unavailability" only necessary under the "general approach" when the analysis includes prior
testimony).
125. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 387.
126. Id. at 399-400.
127. White, 502 U.S. at 354-55. The Supreme Court found that "an unavailability rule would
.do little to improve the accuracy of factfinding, [and] it is likely to impose substantial addi-
tional burdens on the factfinding process." Id. at 355. See also Douglass, supra note 8. at 206-07.
128. White, 502 U.S. at 349.
129. Id. at 349-51. See also Friedman, supra note 39, at 1016-17 (finding that the general
unavailability rule articulated in Roberts was too stringent thus, causing it to eventually break
down).
130. White, 502 U.S. at 349-50.
131. Id.
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Yet, in Inadi and White, the Court held that while the "unavailability
requirement" applied in the case of prior testimony, it was not appli-
cable to statements of co-conspirators, excited utterances, or state-
ments made for purposes of medical treatment. 32 This limitation was
the beginning of the deterioration of the "general approach to con-
frontation analysis."' 133
Distinguishable from White and Inadi, the United States Supreme
Court faced a problem with the second prong of the "general ap-
proach," or the "firmly rooted" hearsay exception, in Lee v. Illinois.n34
In Lee, an accomplice incriminated not only himself, but also the de-
fendant, for the crime of murder when he was interrogated by the
police. 135 The accomplice was theoretically unavailable as a witness at
the defendant's trial because he asserted his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. 36 It could be argued that since the accom-
plice accepted part of the blame for the murders, his confession fell
within the firmly rooted hearsay exception for declarations against pe-
nal interest. 137 However, a majority of the Court analyzed the accom-
plice's admission and "reject[ed] respondent's categorization of the
hearsay involved in this case as a simple 'declaration against penal
interest.' That concept defines too large a class for meaningful Con-
frontation Clause analysis. We decide this case as involving a confes-
sion by an accomplice which incriminates a criminal defendant."'' 3
Therefore, the Court held that the accomplice's statement was inad-
missible under the Confrontation Clause, and made it clear that the
per se reliability analysis was not absolute.139 Hence, the Court main-
132. See Friedman, supra note 39, at 1016-17 (stating that the emerging pattern from cases
such as White and Inadi has been to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence). See also Douglass,
supra note 8, at 207 (finding that "[a]fter Inadi and White, the Confrontation Clause 'rule of
necessity' has no real impact on the admission of hearsay").
133. See supra note 132.
134. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
135. Id. at 533-36.
136. Id. at 539.
137. The Federal Rules of Evidence provides an exception to the hearsay rule if the declarant
is unavailable as a witness and if:
laJ statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or
criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a
reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement un-
less believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
FED. R. Evi). 804(b)(3).
138. Lee, 476 U.S. at 544 & n.5.
139. Id. at 543-46. The majority also found that the statements were not sufficient under the
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" prong. Id. at 543-44. This was a point with which
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tained that if a statement by an unavailable declarant fits within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception, it still has the potential to violate the
right of confrontation. 140 Despite this tension in the per se aspect of
the reliability requirement, the Court has continued to find that a
statement is reliable if it falls into a firmly rooted hearsay exception,
and uses the definitions in the Federal Rules of Evidence as a guide to
what hearsay exceptions are "firmly rooted."' 141 As a result of this
tension, the Court may have rendered the "reliability" prong of the
test ultimately useless.142
III. SUBJECT OPINION: LILLY V. VIRGINIA
In Lilly v. Virginia, the United States Supreme Court was once
again faced with the right to confrontation and its application. Al-
though the Court ultimately found that the defendant's right to con-
frontation had been violated, the Court did not agree as to how the
Confrontation Clause should be applied when dealing with the admis-
sion of an "against penal interest" declaration. Moreover, the Court
seemed to solidify the fact that while a case with facts similar to Lilly
may be more easy to resolve as a confrontation violation, there re-
mains numerous unanswered questions as to how the analysis on con-
frontation jurisprudence might be navigated. Lilly illustrates the need
for a united approach to confrontation analysis.
A. Lower Court Decisions
In Lilly, the Circuit Court of Montgomery County found Benjamin
Lee Lilly guilty of robbery, abduction, carjacking, possession of a fire-
arm by a felon, and four charges of illegal use of a firearm. As a result
of the court's ruling, Ben Lilly received two consecutive life sentences
the dissent did not agree. Id. at 551-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Friedman, supra note
39, at 1019-20. Professor Friedman noted:
Lee is particularly interesting because it reflects unwillingness on the part of the major-
ity to accept the full implications of the per se aspects of the Roberts reliability require-
ment, as well as implicit recognition that, even if a statement by an unavailable
declarant fits within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, its admission may violate the
confrontation right.
Id. at 1019.
140. See Friedman, supra note 39, at 1018-19.
141. Id. Furthermore, the Court has not stopped at using the Federal Rules of Evidence, but
has expanded the "firmly rooted" hearsay exception to include almost any hearsay exceptions.
Id.
142. See generally Douglass, supra note 8, at 206-10 (commenting on how the Court's applica-
tion of its "general approach" has diminished it to the point of extinction). See also Friedman,
supra note 39, at 1019-20 (finding that "[a] near synonym for 'firmly rooted,' it seems, is 'in the
Federal Rules of Evidence"').
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plus twenty-seven years. 4 3 The court also imposed a sentence of
death for capital murder, as recommended by the jury. 144 The Su-
preme Court of Virginia upheld Ben Lilly's conviction and sentences
based on his brother's statements to the police, finding that the state-
ments fell within the firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as
statements made by an unavailable witness against his penal inter-
est.' 4 5 Lilly appealed to the United States Supreme Court, who
granted certiorari.146
B. United States Supreme Court Decision
On March 29, 1999, Ben Lilly argued that the statements elicited by
the police from his brother were not against Mark's penal interest be-
cause they shifted the blame onto himself and another accomplice,
thus, the admission of these out of court statements violated the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause. 4 7 In reaching its decision, the
Court turned to the issue of the Confrontation Clause. Although the
Court was divided on how the right to confrontation should be ap-
plied, all nine justices concurred in their judgments and found that
Lilly's right to confrontation had been violated. 148 Thereafter, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia's decision and remanded the case for the Virginia courts to de-
143. Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522, 528, (Va. 1998), rev'd., Lilly v. Virginia 527 U.S.
116 (1999).
144. Lilly, 499 S.E.2d at 528.
145. Id. at 533-35.
146. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 123 (1999).
147. Id. at 122-23.
148. Id. at 119. The plurality opinion, written by Justice Stevens, was joined by Justices Sou-
ter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 120-49. Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in part and
concurred in judgment with the opinion, while Chief Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor and Kennedy, concurred in judgment with the opinion. Id. at 133-34.
With the Court's divergent mode of analysis and lack of a strong plurality opinion, state courts
considering the issue today will likely find it difficult to apply consistent legal reasoning to issues
regarding the right to confrontation. Id. at 133-34 & n.4. Justice Stevens noted that several
states, such as Arkansas, Indiana, Maine, Nevada. New Jersey, North Dakota, and Vermont,
provide statutorily that their against penal interest hearsay exceptions do not allow the admis-
sion of a co-defendant's statement that inculpates both himself and the accused. Id. at n.4. Sev-
eral other states, such as Delaware. Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Texas and West Virginia,
have adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). Id. See supra note 137 (defining the hearsay
exceptions for statements made against pecuniary or proprietary interest). Still other states,
such as Alabama, Georgia, and Missouri, have no statutory exception for "against penal inter-
est." Id. However, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that several United States Courts of Appeals
have admitted confessions that were made by co-defendants while in custody, which equally
inculpated the co-defendant and the accused. Id. at 146 n.2. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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cide whether the Sixth Amendment error was "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." 149
1. The Plurality Opinion
Justice Stevens, in his plurality opinion, emphasized the continued
validity of the "general approach" test in Roberts, to determine
whether a hearsay exception satisfies the Confrontation Clause. 150
Justice Stevens commented that
the veracity of hearsay statements is sufficiently dependable to al-
low the untested admission of such statements against an accused
when (1) 'the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion' or (2) it contains 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness'
such that adversarial testing would be expected to add little, if any-
thing, to the statements' reliability. 151
Furthermore, Justice Stevens defined a "firmly rooted" hearsay excep-
tion as one that in light of "longstanding judicial and legislative expe-
rience, rests on such [a] solid foundation that admission of virtually
any evidence within it comports with the 'substance of the constitu-
tional protection."' 1 52 Justice Stevens supplied the example of sponta-
neous declarations as a firmly rooted exception; since the states
accepted spontaneous declarations as exceptions, they were over two
centuries old, and considered credible. 5 3 Moreover, Justice Stevens
equated hearsay exceptions to the procedure of cross-examination
and stated that "established practice, in short, must confirm that state-
ments falling within a category of hearsay inherently 'carr[y] special
guarantees of credibility' essentially equivalent to, or greater than,
those produced by the Constitution's preference for cross-examined
trial testimony.' 54
Justice Stevens defined three categories of statements given against
one's penal interest that qualify as a "firmly rooted" hearsay excep-
tions.155 The first category included "voluntary admissions against the
149. Id. at 140. The Court cited Chapman v. California, for the "harmless beyond a reasona-
ble doubt" standard. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)
150. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 124-25. Justice Stevens noted that the statements taken from Lilly's
brother were obviously obtained for the purpose of using them as evidence in a later trial. Id. at
125. He analogized this to the presentation of ex parte affidavits in early English proceedings,
which the right to confrontation was thought to ameliorate. Id.
151. Id. at 124-25.
152. Id. at 126 (quoting Wright, 497 US. at 817; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; Mattox, 156 U.S. at
244).
153. Id.
154. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 126.
155. Id. at 127. Justice Stevens stated that the first category, voluntary admissions by the
declarant, is routinely offered into evidence and found to be admissible by courts. Id. He em-
phasized the importance of separating the first category from the third, in which the prosecution
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declarant," the second category included "exculpatory evidence of-
fered by a defendant who claims that the declarant committed, or was
involved in, the offense," and the third category included "evidence
offered by the prosecution to establish the guilt of an alleged accom-
plice of the declarant."'' 56 Justice Stevens found the third category to
be of "recent vintage" and not a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception in
Confrontation Clause analysis because accomplices typically have an
interest in betraying their co-defendants. 57 Justice Stevens found,
more importantly, that the third category of statements against penal
interest was inherently unreliable and functioned similarly to the an-
cient ex parte affidavit system used by the English courts.158 Thus,
offers evidence by the declarant against an alleged accomplice, in determining the admissibility
against penal interest. Id. See generally Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (finding
that a confession against penal interest did not warrant its use against the defendant). Justice
Stevens reviewed the history behind exculpatory evidence offered by a defendant against a de-
clarant by citing the Donnelly rule, which barred the admission of other person's confessions that
exculpated the accused. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 129. See also Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243,
272-77 (1913) (finding "declarations of this character" incompetent to establish any specific fact
and excludable under hearsay rules). Justice Stevens explained that the Donnelly rule became
the subject of much criticism:
The only practical consequences of this unreasoning limitation are shocking to the
sense of justice; for, in its commonest application, it requires, in a criminal trial, the
rejection of a confession, however well authenticated, of a person deceased or insane or
fled from the jurisdiction (and therefore quite unavailable) who has avowed himself to
be the true culprit .... It is therefore not too late to retrace our steps, and to discard
this barbarous doctrine, which would refuse to let an innocent accused vindicate him-
self even by producing to the tribunal a perfectly authenticated written confession,
made on the very gallows, by the true culprit now beyond the reach of justice.
Lilly, 527 U.S. at 129-30 (quoting 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1477, pp.2 8 9 -9 0 (3d ed. 1940)). In
1973, the Court found Wigmore's view to be more rational and held that criminal defendants
have the right to introduce evidence of third parties' declarations against penal interest when
there is considerable assurance of reliability. Id. at 130 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 300 (1973)).
156. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 127.
157. Id. at 130-31.
158. Id. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599-601 (1994) (using Federal Rules of
Evidence 804(b)(3), rather than the Confrontation Clause, to hold that an accomplice's state-
ment against penal interest was not admissible against the defendant); Lee, 476 U.S. at 541 (find-
ing accomplices' confessions that incriminate defendants presumptively unreliable); Cruz v. New
York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 (1987) (White, J., dissenting) (finding that such statements "have tradi-
tionally been viewed with special suspicion"); Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136 (finding such statements
are "inevitably suspect"); Douglas, 380 U.S. at 419 (finding admission of non-testifying accom-
plice confession that inculpated the defendant denied the defendant the right to cross-examina-
tion) Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 204 (1909) (stating that a confession which
inculpates an accomplice with a defendant "ought to be received with suspicion, and with the
very greatest care and caution"). But see Dutton, 400 U.S. at 86-89 (finding co-conspirator state-
ment against penal interest admissible). Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed Dutton in his sepa-
rate opinion in Lilly. 527 U.S. at 144. Chief Justice Rehnquist found that since Dutton involved
an accomplice's statement to a fellow prisoner, it is distinguishable from the other cases involv-
ing custodial confessions. Id. at 147. Dutton involved a jailhouse confession to a fellow inmate,
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Justice Stevens vigorously upheld the Court's prior decisions, which
involved accomplice confessions and their inherent unreliability, and
suggested that precedent supported Lilly's holding.'5 9
Justice Steven's plurality opinion further held that "accomplice's
confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly
rooted exception to the hearsay rule as that concept has been defined
in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. ' 160 Moreover, as stated
by prior Supreme Court decisions, if hearsay evidence is used to con-
vict a defendant, it must be inherently reliable and cannot "bootstrap"
onto other evidence at trial that corroborates the accomplice's
statements.
161
2. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Concurrence
Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed substantially with Justice Steven's
broad plurality opinion, and argued that the plurality addressed the
wrong question when it devoted much of its attention toward assess-
ing whether a declaration against penal interest is a "firmly rooted
exception" to the hearsay rule. 162 Justice Rehnquist found that "Mark
Lilly's statements inculpating his brother in the murder of DeFilippis
[were] not in the least against Mark's penal interest." 163 He further
found that "[t]his case therefore does not raise the question whether
the Confrontation Clause permits the admission of a genuinely self-
inculpatory statement that also inculpates a co-defendant, and our
precedent does not compel the broad holding suggested by the plural-
ity today." 164
Moreover, Justice Rehnquist noted that several federal courts have
found that the declaration against penal interest, which can equally
inculpate the declarant and the defendant, is sufficiently reliable to
admit into evidence. 165 He found Mark Lilly's confession incriminat-
thus Dutton was not an exception to a long line of cases finding custodial confessions inculpating
the co-defendants as violating the Confrontation Clause, as Justice Stevens found, but a separate
case altogether outside that line of cases. Id.
159. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
160. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134.
161. Id. at 136-38. Justice Stevens relied on Wright for the proposition that corroborating
evidence cannot be used to support the reliability of a hearsay statement. Id. In Wright, the
Idaho criminal trial judge admitted a hearsay statement by a child, under Idaho's recognized
hearsay rule, which was supported by corroborating evidence. Wright, 497 U.S. at 805. The
Court refused to allow the hearsay statement to be admissible because the statement must be
inherently reliable, not found reliable based on other testimony at trial. Id. at 822.
162. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 144-45 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
163. Id. at 146.
164. Id.
165. Chief Justice Rehnquist found that two different types of statements were protected in
various federal courts: (1) statements that truly inculpate the declarant that are made while in
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ing his brother, which was a statement made as part of a custodial
confession and clearly not a declaration against penal interest, typical
of the statements the Court has viewed with "special suspicion" in the
past. 166 Justice Rehnquist would not extend the holding any farther
than to say that the custodial confession falls under the line of cases
that have found these types of confessions inadmissible.167 In Justice
Rehnquist's view,
[t]he plurality's blanket ban on the government's use of accomplice
statements that incriminate a defendant thus sweeps beyond the
facts of this case and our precedent, ignoring both the exculpatory
nature of Mark's confession and the circumstances in which it was
given. Unlike the plurality, I would limit our holding here to the
case at hand, and decide only that Mark Lilly's custodial confession
laying sole responsibility on petitioner cannot satisfy a firmly rooted
hearsay exception. 168
Justice Rehnquist further found that it was difficult to apply any
standard in Lilly because the lower courts had found that Mark Lilly's
confession was firmly rooted. Therefore, the lower courts had not in-
quired into whether the statement bore "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness."'' 69 Since the second prong of the Roberts test was
not reached in the lower courts, Justice Rehnquist felt that the plural-
ity was deciding an issue that had never been passed on in the lower
courts. 70 Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist found the plurality's con-
clusion, holding that appellate courts must independently review a
lower court's finding that a hearsay statement bears particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness, particularly worrisome. In view of the
fact that a trial judge is in a much better position to decide the fact
custody: and (2) statements made while in a non-custodial setting, such as statements to fellow
prisoners or confessions to family members or friends, Lilly, 527 U.S. at 146-47 & nn.2-3 (citing
United States v. Keltner, 147 F.3d 662, 670 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that a "statement 'clearly
subjected' declarant to criminal liability for 'activity in which [he] participated and was planning
to participate with ... both defendants"'); Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1134 (10th Cir. 1996)
(finding that the "entire statement inculpated both [defendant] and [declarant] equally" and
"neither [attempted] to shift blame to his co-conspirators nor to curry favor from the police or
prosecutor"); United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1362-64 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that "federal
declaration against penal interest exception firmly rooted in case involving accomplice's state-
ments made to two associates"): United States v. Seeley, 892 F.2d 1, 2 (lst Cir. 1989) (holding
"exception firmly rooted in case involving statements made to declarant's girlfriend and stepfa-
ther"): United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding "no violation in
admitting accomplice's statements to a friend")).
166. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 146. See also supra note 158 (Chief Justice Rehnquist's discussion of
Dtton).
167. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 147. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
168. 527 U.S. at 147-48.




specific issue of trustworthiness, appellate review of every case would
result in a waste of judicial resources.1 71
3. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer's Concurring Opinions
Justices Scalia and Thomas both wrote concurring opinions, which
focused on the Framers' original intent behind the Confrontation
Clause and its inclusion in the Sixth Amendment.1 72 The Justices by-
passed the assumed intent behind the Confrontation Clause, to curb
an inquisitorial government that used affidavits of hearsay declarants
as an option for face-to-face confrontation, and noted their preference
for a narrow approach to the Confrontation Clause.17 3 Justices Scalia
and Thomas contended that the implication of the Confrontation
Clause was by "extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are con-
tained in formalized testimonial material, such as affidavits, deposi-
tions, prior testimony, or confessions.' 1 4 This approach is similar to,
though not as broad as, the testimonial view of confrontation
analysis. 175
On the other hand, Justice Breyer concurred separately in the judg-
ment and pointed out that not addressing the confrontation-hearsay
interrelationship in Lilly did not mean that that interrelationship was
a moot point with the Court. 176 Justice Breyer recognized that since
the Court did not reach the confrontation-hearsay matter in Lilly, it
would "leave it open for another day."' 177 Thus, Justice Breyer left the
door open for future confrontation-hearsay analysis and the possibil-
ity of the Court severing the connection between the right of confron-
tation and the hearsay rule. 78
171. Id.
172. Id. at 143-44. For a detailed discussion of Justice Scalia's approach to the Confrontation
Clause, see Cornelius M. Murphy, Justice Scalia and the Confrontation Clause: A Case Study In
Originalist Adjudication of Individual Rights, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1243 (1997).
173. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 143. See supra notes 39-56 and accompanying text. See also Murphy,
supra note 172 and accompanying text.
174. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 143 (quoting White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)). Professor Friedman employed a similar approach to Justice
Thomas' opinion in White, which was propounded by Professor Amar in his recent book, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, infra note 180. See Friedman supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 191-220 and accompanying text, which gives an explanation of Professor
Friedman's testimonial analysis.
176. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 142-43.
177. Id. Justice Breyer's concurring opinion focused on the amicus brief written by the ACLU
and how it addressed the Court's past effort to tie the Confrontation Clause directly to the
hearsay rule. Id. at 140-41. See infra notes 184-189 and accompanying text.
178. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 140-43.
2001] 1161
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
IV. ANALYSIS: THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
The history of the Confrontation Clause and the evidence rules gov-
erning hearsay succeeds in explaining how these two doctrines
evolved, but fails to answer the question of what the future holds for
the tension between procedural rule of confrontation and hearsay
rules of evidence. Suggestions abound on how the Court should inter-
pret the Confrontation Clause and how it should apply to defend-
ants. 79 Unfortunately, the lack of consistent legal precedent does not
aid courts in discening the expectations of a confrontation analysis.
While this area of law is ripe for commentary, an attempt has been
made to address two theories of confrontation analysis.
One such approach, the testimonial view, is similar to that of Justice
Clarence Thomas. 80 The testimonial view of confrontation analysis
centers on witnesses that make testimonial statements, whether at
trial or beforehand. The testimonial view contends that the Confron-
tation Clause applies to a more narrow set of statements than hearsay
and thus "is far less extensive, but far more intensive, than the rule
against hearsay."' 81
A second view suggests a slightly different approach, which centers
on prosecutorial involvement in the declarant's statement. 82 The
prosecutorial restraint model, consistent with Sixth Amendment juris-
prudence, specifically takes into account the historical reasoning be-
hind the Bill of Rights and attempts to restore control of the central
government through the Confrontation Clause. 18 3
In its amicus curae brief for Lilly v. Virginia, the ACLU advocated
acceptance of a categorical approach to confrontation analysis by pro-
moting both the testimonial view and the prosecutorial restraint
model. 84 The ACLU concluded that since both analyses focused on
when confrontation is necessary and not the requirements that are
necessary to have successful confrontation, such as having the witness
and defendant in the same room, either categorical approach would
serve as a viable alternative to current confrontation analysis.'85
179. The Court, in Roberts, commented expansively on the "outpouring of scholarly commen-
tary." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.9.
180. See Friedman, supra note 39, at 1013. See also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONsTIruTON
AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 89-144 (1997); Amar, supra note 25, at 696.
181. Friedman, supra note 39, at 1013.
182. See Berger, supra note 10, at 562-63.
183. Id.
184. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 25.
185. Id. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (finding that the Confrontation
Clause does not prohibit the use of one-way closed-circuit television in a child abuse case);
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The ACLU viewed the Supreme Court as implicitly accepting the
testimonial view and the prosecutorial restraint model in their past
decisions, although not consciously articulating such ideas.186 For sev-
eral reasons, the ACLU's categorical approach is the most plausible
approach to Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the Confronta-
tion Clause. First, a categorical approach incorporates ideas such as
originalism and the historical reasoning behind the Bill of Rights and,
in particular, the Sixth Amendment. 18 7 Second, a categorical ap-
proach establishes a bright line test for future confrontation analysis.
Third, a categorical approach comports with Supreme Court prece-
dent involving the right to confrontation.8 8 Finally, this approach re-
leases the tension involved in the Supreme Court's confrontation-
hearsay analysis that began in Roberts.'89
The Supreme Court's position on the Confrontation Clause is de-
batable. Lower courts need consistency and bright line rules in order
to make sure that they are correctly applying Supreme Court prece-
dent to confrontation cases. The Lilly opinion may be a further dilu-
tion of the Confrontation Clause, or a narrowing of the hearsay
doctrine. Nonetheless, it is imperative that courts and members of the
legal profession are able to understand the Confrontation Clause and
its procedural rules.
The ACLU advances both the testimonial view and the
prosecutorial restraint method as the most plausible approach for con-
frontation analysis. The testimonial view approaches confrontation
analysis by asking whether a declarant was acting as a witness, while
the prosecutorial restraint method approaches confrontation analysis
by asking whether the historical objectives underpinning the Confron-
tation Clause have been followed by prosecutors and other govern-
ment officials. These categorical approaches address confrontation
analysis with a bright line test consisting of rules that are easy for
lower courts to follow and apply. However, though these two ap-
proaches are not without weaknesses, it can be argued that the weak-
nesses of these two approaches far outweigh the confusion and
tension used by the Supreme Court when applying the "reliability"
method as adopted in Roberts.
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 564 (1988) (holding that the Confrontation Clause was not
violated by admission of witness testimony who had sustained memory loss).
186. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 25.
187. Id.
188. Id. See infra notes 243-291 and accompanying text.
189. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 25.
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A. The Testimonial Approach
The testimonial approach to confrontation analysis raises the key
question of whether, in making the statement at issue, the declarant
was acting as a witness within the meaning of the Confrontation
Clause. 9 19 Likewise, one must question whether a person who makes
a statement to police, such as the description of a bank robber, or a
battered women who tells a social worker that her husband beat her,
is acting as a witness within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.
To answer these questions it has been suggested that, in order for
statements to be included at trial, the breadth of the testimony must
include not only testimony given under oath, but also testimony given
in the form of statements such as "formalized testimonial materials,"
which include affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, and confes-
sions. 191 Thus, the testimonial approach is applicable to statements
recited at trial as well as those made beforehand. 92
It has been argued that the Court has engaged in the wrong inquiry,
since the Roberts decision, by using reliability as a criterion for
whether a defendant's right to confrontation applies to a specific situ-
ation. 193 "[T]he Confrontation Clause does not speak of the rule
against hearsay or of its exceptions, or of unavailability, reliability, or
truth-determination. It says simply that the accused shall have a right
'to be confronted with the Witnesses against him."1 94 Furthermore, it
can be argued that reliability is a difficult standard to determine and is
immune to appellate review, since "any serious attempt to determine
the reliability of a statement must take into account many circum-
stances of the particular statement and its context."' 95 These argu-
ments support the adoption of a rule that does away with "reliability"
as a criterion and instead advances a more uniform bright line test of
confrontation analysis.
It has also been suggested that truth-determination is a poor crite-
rion for deciding whether the Confrontation Clause applies to a situa-
190. Id. at 21-22.
191. See Friedman, supra note 39, at 1025. Professor Friedman agreed with the type of state-
ments that Justice Thomas believed should be protected by the Confrontation Clause. Id. How-
ever, Professor Friedman took his analysis one step further and included statements that were
informally declared with the intent and anticipation that they were to be used in a criminal
investigation or trial. Id. Similarly, Professor Amar noted that he would include videotapes,
transcripts, depositions, and affidavits. See Amar, supra note 25, at 129.
192. Friedman, supra note 39, at 1026.
193. Id. at 1027. See supra notes 112-142 and accompanying text.
194. Id. at 1022. See also U.S. CONsi. amend. VI.
195. Friedman, supra note 39, at 1029. Professor Friedman found that reliability is not proper
for the truth determination process. Id. at 1027-29. Furthermore, unreliable evidence may be
just as important as reliable evidence in advancing the truth determination process. Id.
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tion.196 The right to confrontation is a fundamental right with deep
roots implicating the same values that are attributed to other rights
such as the right to counsel and the right to trial by jury. 197 Therefore,
the Confrontation Clause should be adhered to "even if in the particu-
lar case it does not help accurate fact-finding-just as we adhere to
the rights of counsel and trial by jury without having to ask whether to
do so in the particular case will do more good than harm." 198
As alluded to earlier, it is important under the testimonial view to
ascertain whether statements made before trial are in fact testimo-
nial. 199 In making this inquiry, if the statement given before trial was
not considered testimonial, there would likely be a reduction in the
number of possible hearsay declarants, thus, the Confrontation Clause
will not be implicated. 200 Furthermore, the right to confrontation
should be considered absolute, with no exceptions, when applied to
testimonial statements. Making this right absolute would equate the
right to confrontation with the right to trial or the right to counsel. 20 1
In making the right to confrontation absolute, as applied to testimo-
196. Id. at 1028. See also Friedman, supra note 39, at 1012 n.8. Professor Friedman lists nu-
merous opinions on the nature of the Confrontation Clause including: Michael H. Graham, The
Confrontation Clause, The Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the
Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523, 600 (1988) ("arguing that the Confrontation Clause could be
interpreted as meaning that '[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to
be present and to cross-examine his accusers if they are available"'); Jonakait, supra note 27, at
622 ("contending that '[t]he confrontation clause gives the accused the right to exclude all out-
of-court statements when the declarant is not produced except when the prosecutor establishes
the lack of a reasonable probability that the accused's cross-examination of the declarant would
have led the jury to weigh the evidence more favorably to the accused"'); Charles R. Nesson &
Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring Foundational Testing and Corroboration
Under the Confrontation Clause, 81 VA. L. REV. 149, 173 (1995) ("proposing 'an interpretation
of the Confrontation Clause that will limit the use of hearsay evidence to situations in which (1)
the judge has made an independent foundational finding that the hearsay is competent and (2)
the hearsay is independently corroborated"'); Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of
Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REV. 623, 626-
27 & n.14 (1992) ("contending that the Confrontation Clause should be interpreted in light of
three dimensions: an evidentiary dimension that 'addresses the concern that the reliability of a
statement offered as evidence be tested by cross-examination,' a procedural dimension that 'ad-
dresses the concern that a hearsay statement may be the product of misconduct by the prosecu-
tion or its agents,' and a societal dimension that 'embodies communal values by granting
criminal defendants the affirmative right to face their accusers"'). Id. See also Murphy, supra
note 172, at 1266 (concluding that Justice Scalia's originalist approach "is not only more analyti-
cally sound than the approaches advocated by other members of the Court, but also affords
criminal defendants greater confrontation rights across the board"). Id.
197. Id. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
198. See Friedman, supra note 39, at 1028.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1030.
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nial statements, a bright line rule would emerge in order to gauge the
protection and application of one's right to confrontation. 20 2
Furthermore, under the testimonial approach, the availability of the
witness becomes an irrelevant concern in deciding whether confronta-
tion should apply, a key prong in the Roberts "reliability" analysis. 20 3
The unavailability of a witness is inconsequential if the defendant had
ample opportunity to examine the witness under oath before the
trial.20 4 Contrary to the Court's general rule in Roberts, which
"seemed to imply ... that, to use the hearsay or an out-of-court de-
clarant, the prosecution must show the unavailability of the declarant
as well as the reliability of the statement," the testimonial approach
simply assesses whether the statement was testimonial.205 Thus, if the
statement was testimonial, then the right of confrontation applies re-
gardless of whether the declarant is available. 20 6
There are two extreme exceptions to the proposition of disregard-
ing the availability of the witness in determining the right of confron-
202. See id. Professor Friedman does not think that balancing tests are the answer in confron-
tation jurisprudence, although "[a]bsolute rights may not be much in fashion in this "age of
balancing." Id. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balanc-
ing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987). Professor Aleinikoff delivers a thoughtful article on the pitfalls of
balancing constitutional rights in a justice system:
The balancers have gained the high ground, at this point, by adverse possession. Bal-
ancing has attained legitimacy through the reputation of its early advocates and the
passage of time. Moreover, if constitutional interpretation is ultimately a reflection of
larger, deeper trends in social consciousness, we may now simply be deaf to the criti-
cisms of balancing. It is deeply engrained in us to see the law as a forum for competing
interests and moral and legal choice as turning on an evaluation of the strength of those
interests.
Here, then, is the ultimate irony of balancing. Balancing was a liberating methodol-
ogy at the outset. It took blinders off judges' eyes and let them openly take into ac-
count the connections between constitutional law and the real world. Preaching a
pragmatic, realistic approach to constitutional law, it promised doctrine arrived at ob-
jectively and grounded in the facts of the society to which it applied. But balancing,
whatever its merits as a way out of formalism, has itself become rigid and formulaic. It
gives answers, but it fails to persuade.
Id. at 1004.
203. Friedman, supra note 39, at 1032. The availability of a witness is always a concern in
confrontation analysis because this determines whether a hearsay exception will be used to ex-
cuse the right to confrontation. id. However, Professor Friedman noted that other doctrines,
besides unavailability of a witness, may apply, such as hearsay law, and exclude the statement on
the grounds that it is more prejudicial than probative. Id. at 1032 n.101.
204. Id. at 1032-33.
205. Id. at 1034. See Green, 399 U.S. at 172-89 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan stated
that the Confrontation Clause "reaches no farther than to require the prosecution to produce
any available witness whose declarations it seeks to use in a criminal trial." Id. at 174 (emphasis
in original).
206. Friedman, supra note 39, at 1034.
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tation.207 First, if the accused causes the unavailability of the
declarant, then he forfeits his right to confrontation; however, if the
prosecution causes the unavailability of the declarant, then the right of
confrontation prevails.208 For the cases in which the declarant is un-
available, through no fault of the defendant or the prosecutor, the
court presumably would not allow the testimony into evidence.2) 9
Another exception applies to the accused in the case of compulsory
process, where intimidation causes the declarant, most likely a child
declarant, not to testify at trial.210 If a court believes that intimidation
of the declarant is the motivation behind the accused's invocation of
the Confrontation Clause, then a court can admit the prior statement
and let the accused, instead of the prosecution, call the declarant to
the stand to help overcome the confrontation issue.211 The Court pre-
viously placed great emphasis on the accused's right to compulsion
and used it to reject the accused's confrontation claims. 212
207. See id.
208. Id. at 1034-35. Professor Friedman contended that his
conclusion is fortified by the fact that in most cases, the prosecution can protect itself
quite easily against the later unavailability of the witness . . . [since in his view] the
Confrontation Clause's reach is limited to testimonial statements, and such statements
are rarely made long before investigation and prosecution have begun. Thus, the pros-
ecutor can usually arrange for the witness to be deposed while she is still available,
giving due notice to the accused.
Id. at 1035.
209. Id. at 1035-36. Professor Friedman advocated a result similar to when the witness dies
prior to cross-examination. In that case, the statement does not make it into evidence. In his
view, neither should a statement made by an out-of-court witness. Id.
210. See Friedman, supra note 39, at 1036-38. Professor Friedman argued that since the text
of the Confrontation Clause is in the passive voice, the accused only needs to demand his right.
Id. at 1036-37. If this premise is true, then a requirement to actively invoke compulsory process
to "obtain" the presence of a witness imposes an improper burden on the defendant. Id.
211. Id. at 1036-37. Professor Friedman was adamant in declaring compulsory process as a
trap for the accused by explaining that:
even when the compulsory process will secure the attendance of the witness, so that the
accused could put her on the stand, this is far less satisfactory for the accused than the
opportunity to cross-examine. When a witness finishes testifying for the prosecution,
defense counsel usually finds it worthwhile to rise and ask at least a few questions,
exploring the possibility of impeaching the witness and, if the witness seems nearly
invulnerable, sitting down promptly in order to play down her testimony. But if an out-
of-court statement is introduced as part of the prosecution's case, it is far riskier and
costlier for the defense counsel, in the middle of his own case, to put the declarant on
the stand, invite her to repeat the damaging account, this time live in front of the jury,
then try to shake her-and if he comes up empty-handed, try to explain to the jury why
he bothered with the whole exercise. Small wonder defense counsel hardly ever tries.
Id. But see Richard D. Friedman, Improving the Procedure for Resolving Hearsay Issues, 13
CARDozo L. REV. 883, 892-904 (1991) (suggesting a procedural change that would support a
fundamental reform of hearsay law and improve defendants ability to cross-examine witnesses).
212. Friedman, supra note 39, at 1036-37 & n. 115 (citing White, 502 U.S. at 355; Inadi. 475 U.S.
at 397-98 & n.7).
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Finally, the testimonial view's use of the word "witnesses" is consis-
tent with Justice Thomas' conclusion that "the Confrontation Clause
is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are con-
tained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, deposi-
tions, prior testimony, or confessions. ' 21 3 However, the testimonial
approach goes one step further, considering statements made by the
declarant with the understanding that they will be used in litigation as
testimonial.214 Such statements would include those made to legal au-
thorities or intermediaries with the intent that they will be used at
trial, even though they were not made under oath.215 Declarants
would be unable to take advantage of the accused's confrontation
rights by making statements to a private party with the intent that
they will reach the factfinder but with no intent of being available to
testify, therefore, the less formalized statements would, in effect, pro-
tect the accused.216 Furthermore, statements made by the declarant,
who understands that the statements will not play a part in litigation,
are not considered testimonial and thus, do not implicate the Confron-
tation Clause. 217
Therefore, the term "witnesses" should not be limited to statements
made directly to authorities or made in formalized statements. 21 8 The
testimonial approach to the Confrontation Clause eliminates wit-
nesses testifying "in informal ways that avoid confrontation .... ,,219
This structure . . . reflects a fundamental premise of our judicial
system-that the prosecution cannot present as evidence against a
criminal defendant a statement made with the intention that it be so
used unless the accused has had an opportunity to examine the wit-
ness. It sets up a bright-line rule, but one that, when sensitively
applied, leads to sensible results. Moreover, it confines the confron-
tation right to its proper realm, those who make testimonial state-
ments and so act as witnesses. Thus, it is clearly distinct from the
vast morass of hearsay law.2211
Accordingly, it is clear that the declarant who told police about the
description of the bank robber and the battered housewife who told
her social worker about her husband beating her, would be considered
witnesses for confrontation purposes. Nonetheless, the battered wife
213. Id. at 1038; White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
214. Friedman, supra note 39, at 1038-39.
215. See id. at 1039-42.
216. Id. at 1042.
217. Id. at 1039.
218. Id. at 1043.
219. Id.
220. See Friedman, supra note 39. at 1043.
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would have to know that her statements were going to be used in fu-
ture litigation against her husband for them to be considered
testimonial.
B. The Prosecutorial-Restraint Method
Most commentators agree that the Supreme Court's emphasis on
the Confrontation Clause as a promoter of accurate fact-finding is er-
roneous. 221 The Court's approach to confrontation analysis ignores
the historical underpinnings of the right to confrontation and the
background against which the Framers drafted the Confrontation
Clause. 222 Arguably, the Court utilized an evidentiary approach,
which ultimately ignored the Confrontation Clause's role in re-
straining the government's willful use of power, which included keep-
ing government agents under control, and "ensuring the ability of
ordinary citizens to participate in this process. '223 Moreover, cross-
examination of government agents regarding statements made to
them does not alleviate the problem of faulty protection for the ac-
cused because statements elicited by the government are of a special
nature, and the Confrontation Clause should focus on the Bill of
Right's concern over exercising control over the government.224
Prosecutions for child sexual abuse and drug offenses are the two
types of cases that require the most aggressive type of prosecutorial
restraint. 225 As a result of severe prosecutorial pressure from the pub-
lic in these cases, and the strong incentive to succumb to political pres-
sures, it is believed that the Confrontation Clause "should be
221. See Berger, supra note 10, at 559. Professor Berger explained:
This insistence that the sole function of the Confrontation Clause is to promote more
accurate fact-finding ignores the historical background against which the Clause was
drafted and overlooks the context in which it was placed. The majority of the Court has
forgotten, at least on a conscious level, that the Confrontation Clause is a provision in
the Sixth Amendment, that the Sixth Amendment is a part of the Bill of Rights, and
that the Bill of Rights is part of the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 559. See also Friedman supra note 39, at 1013-14 (stating that his article will attempt to
prove that "reliability and truth-determination are poor criteria to govern application of the
Confrontation Clause").
222. See Berger, supra note 10, at 559.
223. Id. at 560.
224. Id. at 561, 563.
225. Id. at 564. Professor Berger found that recent child sexual abuse cases have prompted
commentary in which the prosecution was likened to the "over-zealousness encountered in the
Salem Witch trials." Id. at 564. Observers of these recent cases claimed that "[p]rosecutors or
their agents cajoled, coaxed, and threatened children during interviews, often with special tech-
niques that possess a high potential for improper suggestion. Furthermore, the prosecution's
experts often have publicly funded jobs and rely on studies financed by government research
grants. Thus they are dependent on the epidemic's continuance." Id. at 564-65.
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interpreted to restrain prosecutors from using suggestive, manipula-
tive questioning techniques. ' 226 To make the Confrontation Clause a
more meaningful right there is a need for prophylactic measures, espe-
cially when child sexual abuse and drug offenses are involved in the
confrontation analysis. 227
The prosecutorial restraint model was extracted from history under-
lying the right of confrontation and its accompanying caselaw. 228 It is
important to recognize that the inclusion of the Confrontation Clause
in the Bill of Rights occurred due to the Framers' knowledge of the
unchecked power that government could have over its people. If the
Framers "did not perceive a connection between the notion of con-
frontation and the reduction of the inquisitorial powers of the Crown,
then confrontation looks more like Wigmore's purely evidentiary doc-
trine than a procedure that also aspires to prevent government from
leaning on witnesses and concealing the process from the jury. ' 229
Furthermore, a relationship exists between the right of confrontation
and the role of the jury because of its role in providing protection to
people's rights. 230
[T]wo hundred years ago when the Bill of Rights was enacted, the
right to confrontation was viewed in conjunction with other proce-
dural rights surrounding trial by jury. Confrontation was part of an
arsenal designed not only to ensure accurate results in criminal tri-
als, but also to restrain the government in criminal trials from acting
in a covert, repugnant manner that would be concealed from the
people.231
The prosecutorial restraint method is premised on the fact that con-
frontation emerged as a bundle of rights aimed at curbing
prosecutorial power and mandated that the Supreme Court respect
the values behind the right to confrontation, as it does other procedu-
ral rights, in order to accurately determine how confrontation should
function. 232 In two separate lines of cases, the Supreme Court recog-
nized the need for special rules when prosecutors are in a position to
226. Id. at 565-66.
227. Id. at 566.
228. See Berger, supra note 10, at 567-604.
229. Id. at 578-586.
230. Id. at 583-84.
231. Id. at 586.
232. Id. at 586 & nn.17, 114 (citing NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 46.05 103 (C. Dallas Sands ed., 5th ed., 1992) (finding that a statute is passed as a whole
and has one general purpose or intent); Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (quoting
United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850) (stating that "[iln ex-
pounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but
look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy"))).
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mold trial court proceedings. 233 However inconsistent, the Court did
not require counsel to be present when the prosecution obtained
statements from witnesses prior to trial, but rather, assumed that the
details of the prosecutions questioning would eventually come out at
trial.234 However, starting with Roberts, the Court ruled that confron-
tation at trial can be excused under certain situations, namely when a
declarant's statement has certain indicia of reliability, such that it sat-
isfies a firmly rooted hearsay exception, or when the statement has
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.2 35 The inconsistency
produced when the right to counsel depends on whether one is the
accused or the witness segregates the right to confrontation from
other procedural rights.236
The Supreme Court's sensitivity to inquisitorial questioning is clear
by its analysis in three different types of cases, specifically cases where
there was no hearsay exception, cases that involved the production of
the declarant who made a prior statement, and cases where introduc-
tion of testimony was through a hearsay exception rather than by a
declarant. 237 In the latter two scenarios, it can be argued that the
Court does not restrain prosecutors as adequately as it should because
the less a jury is informed about prosecutorial misconduct, the less the
jury is able to acquit in extreme cases of misconduct.238
Under the prosecutorial restraint approach, a determination must
be made concerning statements according to a hearsay exception elic-
233. See Berger, supra note 10, at 586-89. Here Professor Berger extrapolated from two lines
of cases the Supreme Court's realization that, since the prosecutor is in a position to abuse the
proceedings of the trial, special safeguards are needed. Id. at 586. In the line of cases beginning
with Massiah v. United States, the Court excluded reliable evidence if it was obtained through
inquisitorial practices, that denied the accused procedural rights granted in the Sixth Amend-
ment. 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). See Berger, supra note 10, at 587. The Court found the right to
counsel absolute, even if it interferes with ascertaining the truth. Id. In the line of cases begin-
ning with United States v. Wade, the Supreme Court wanted to make sure that there was a proce-
dure in place to assure that the jury determined the accused's fate and not the police. 388 U.S.
218, 242 (1967). See Berger, supra note 10, at 587.
234. Id. at 588. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
235. See Berger, supra note 10 at 588.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 593-605. For cases in which there was no hearsay exception see Douglas, 380 U.S.
at 416-17 and Pointer, 380 U.S. at 401. A case in which a declarant, who was produced for trial,
made a prior statement that was not subject to confrontation is Owens, 484 U.S. at 556. Finally,
for cases where testimony was introduced under a hearsay exception see Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at
175, and Lee, 476 U.S. at 531.
238. Id. at 599-601. Professor Berger found that although jury nullification is not an accepted
practice, it plays an important role in trials and in stopping the prosecution from melding evi-
dence against the accused. Id. at 599 (citing Katherine Bishop, Diverse Group Wants to Follow




ited by the prosecution, thus testing whether the statements are within
the gambit of the Confrontation Clause. 239 Placing emphasis on the
circumstances surrounding the statement is an appropriate approach
to confrontation jurisprudence, rather than the formalistic view which
limited the Confrontation Clause to particular statements "contained
in formalized testimonial materials. '240
Lastly, the vigorous application of the Confrontation Clause, rather
than its curtailment, recognizes the objectives behind the Bill of
Rights: 24 1
Diminution of the right to confrontation is inconsistent with the
aims of the Bill of Rights. The failure to hold statements elicited by
the prosecution to a higher standard of admissibility defeats the ob-
jective of protecting the individual against the power of the govern-
ment and interferes with the jury's historical function of guarding
our civil liberties.242
C. The ACL U's Adoption of a Categorical Approach
Analytically, the categorical approach adopted by the ACLU differs
from the Supreme Court's approach, yet it is consistent with virtually
all of the results reached by the Court. 243 However, both the testimo-
nial view and the prosecutorial restraint method focus primarily on
239. See Berger, supra note 10, at 607. Professor Berger looked at five separate categories
under her model. The categories were (1) former testimony; (2) declarant produced; (3) co-
conspirators statements; (4) declarations against interest; and (5) the residual hearsay exception.
Id. at 607-12. Under the former testimony category, the rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court fit under the prosecutorial restraint model. Id. at 607. Under the declarant produced
category, if the declarant testifies at trial about his out-of-court statements, he has satisfied the
Confrontation Clause. If, however, the declarant is particularly vulnerable, then the prosecution
is required to produce a tape of the interview or a transcript from a hearing. Id. at 608-09.
Under the co-conspirators statements category, statements elicited by an informant or a govern-
ment agent are presumptively excluded unless the declarant testifies or the government pro-
duces a recording. Id. Custodial declarations against penal interest are per se excluded, and if it
is a non-custodial interview the court must examine the circumstances leading to the statement.
Id. at 609. The residual hearsay exception covers both statements made to the grand jury and a
child's statements. Id. at 610-12. If the statements are made to a grand jury, the testimony must
be excluded unless the accused caused the witness' unavailability at trial or the witness died
before trial. Id. Finally, concerning children's statements, Professor Berger took a strong stand
in suggesting that unless there is production of the questions, the testimony should not be
presented at trial, even if the statement is reliable or the child is produced. Id. at 611-12.
24t0. Id. at 563-64; White, 502 U.S. at 358-66. This approach was advocated by Justice Thomas
in White v. Illinois. Id.
241. See Berger, supra note 10, at 564. Professor Berger utilized similar reasoning as Profes-
sor Friedman in the sense that she felt reliability led to "illusory constitutional protection." Id.
However, her approach differed from Professor Friedman's in that her key question was whether
the government participated in making the declarant a witness against the defendant. See Brief
for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 23.
242. See Berger, supra note 10, at 613.
243. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 25.
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whether confrontation is in fact necessary. 244 As offered, in Lilly, a
categorical analysis introduces a bright line test to confrontation
cases. 245 The categorical approach is based on the Confrontation
Clause's original intent to protect categorical procedural rights, such
as the right to counsel. Further, placement of the right to confronta-
tion in the Sixth Amendment fortifies this conclusion, similar to the
argument put forth by the prosecutorial restraint model.246
Considering the Sixth Amendment in its entirety, it is clear that
there is a bundle of procedural rights that "have more then the right
to accurate fact-finding at their core;" however, the stripping of proce-
dural objectives to further rules of evidence only occurs in the applica-
tion of the Confrontation Clause.247 For example, the use of the
general approach in Ohio v. Roberts not only rid the Confrontation
Clause of absolute procedural rights, but also thwarted confrontation
analysis, providing courts with virtually unreviewable discretion in de-
termining reliability and trustworthiness on an individual case basis. 248
The use of either one of the categorical approaches leads to virtu-
ally the same results reached by the Supreme Court without the need
to entangle confrontation with hearsay. Moreover, the application of
either the categorical approach to Lilly results in a favorable outcome,
consistent with the Supreme Court's judgment, but without the use of
several modes of analysis in order to reach the same result.
1. The Attributes of a Categorical Approach on Confrontation
Analysis
The ACLU, in its amicus curae brief in Lilly, stated that the exact fit
the Supreme Court found between the hearsay rule and the Confron-
tation Clause, when the statement satisfied a "firmly rooted" hearsay
244. Id. at 25 & n.41.
245. Id. at 20.
246. Id. at 14. See supra notes 221-242 and accompanying text.
247. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 14. The ACLU compared the right of confron-
tation to the right of counsel and the right to a jury trial. It posited that the right to counsel is
found to be fundamental even if it disrupts the factfinding process. Id. Furthermore, the right to
trial by jury is also found to be fundamental even if a judge may be more knowledgeable and
capable of unraveling complicated testimony. Id.
248. See Douglass, supra note 8 and accompanying text. See also Brief for Petitioner. supra
note 71, at 15-16, 19. The ACLU noted that in Europe, under the European Convention on
Human Rights, the right to confrontation is recognized as a procedural right, and since the doc-
trine of common law tradition is not encumbered by the hearsay doctrine, there are no hearsay
rules under civil law, therefore Europeans hand down unhindered and articulated decisions re-
garding the right to confrontation. Id. at 15-16. Thus, the ACLU concluded that the Confronta-
tion Clause, in the United States as well as Europe, should guarantee a categorical procedural
right superior to the law of hearsay. Id. at 20.
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exception,2 49 gave lower courts a tremendous amount of leeway to ad-
mit hearsay statements against a criminal defendant.2 5 0 In advocating
a categorical approach, the ACLU found that the "firmly rooted" test
had not been clearly applied in past Supreme Court cases. 2 5  For in-
stance, in White v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the Circuit Court of Vermilion County and Appellate Court of Illi-
nois' decision to admit statements made by a four year-old in the
course of receiving medical care, which implicated the defendant as
her sexual abuser.252 The Court justified the admission of the state-
ments, made during medical diagnosis and treatment, by commenting
that such "firmly rooted" statements were recognized in the Federal
Rules of Evidence and were "widely accepted among the states. '2 53
On the other hand, in Lee v. Illinois,254 the United States Supreme
Court rejected the Appellate Court of Illinois' admission of a state-
ment against penal interest, stating "[t]hat concept [declaration
against penal interest] defines too large a class for meaningful Con-
frontation Clause analysis. ' 255 The hearsay exception was not allowed
even though the Federal Rules of Evidence, along with various states,
had expanded the hearsay exception to include declarations against
penal interest.25 6 When viewed together, it is clear that White and Lee
are not reconcilable.25 7
In White, the Court found both spontaneous declarations and state-
ments made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment inherently
reliable because they were codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence
and widely accepted by the states. 258 In so doing, the Court saw the
need for confrontation to be dispensable. 259 In contrast, the Court in
249. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 16-17 (citing Inadi, 475 U.S. at 387; White, 502 u.S.
at 357 (finding that a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception is so trustworthy that confrontation and
cross-examination would add little to its reliability)).
250. Id.
251. See id. at 17.
252. White, 502 U.S. at 348-49.
253. Id. at 355, 356 & n.8. However, it is relevant that the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence was not until 1975, and prior to that time, the hearsay exception that allowed evidence
to be admitted, in White, was not yet an exception included as generally admissible even if the
statement was relevant to diagnosis or treatment. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 17.
254. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
255. Id. at 544 & n.5.
256. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 17-18. See also supra note 165 and accompany-
ing text.
257. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 18.
258. White, 502 U.S. at 356 & n.8.
259. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 18. The ACLU found that "the need for con-
frontation disappears-even if the exception was extended by the Rules themselves beyond




Lee found that an inherently untrustworthy statement, such as a state-
ment against penal interest, could not automatically be "firmly
rooted," even though that type of statement was codified in the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence and widely accepted as a hearsay exception by
the states.260 Thus, in Lee, the Court saw confrontation as an indis-
pensable right.261 The ultimate problem, illustrated by the inconsis-
tent court decisions in White and Lee, is that courts lack guidance on
how to approach confrontation analysis. For example, if a statement
falls under the Federal Rules of Evidence as a "firmly rooted" hearsay
exception, and is generally accepted by the states then a court, must
question whether there is a confrontation problem or whether the
right to confrontation is not an issue because of prevailing hearsay
exceptions. Looking at White and Lee side by side, the courts may
never know.
In addition, the ACLU argued that the "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness" portion of the Robert's test was inadequate to suf-
ficiently protect a defendant. 262 According to the ACLU, nothing in
the holding of Lee precluded a court from using its discretion in ad-
mitting an out of court statement if it found that the statement had
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. ' 263 Thus, the ACLU
argued that courts would effectively retain "enormous, virtually unre-
viewable, discretion in determining trustworthiness on a case-by-case
basis." 264
The Lilly case demonstrates the subjective nature of the trustworthy




263. Id. at 18-19. The ACLU noted that although the Supreme Court has held that self-incul-
patory portions of a declaration against penal interest satisfies Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3), "Congress certainly could, subject to the constraints of the Confrontation Clause,
make statements admissible based on their proximity to self-inculpatory statements." Id. at 19 &
n.34 (citing Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600 (1994)).
264. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 19-20.
265. See id. at 19. The ACLU found that there might be numerous reasons why Mark Lilly
might falsely accuse his brother of murder, but the right of Ben Lilly to confront his brother
should not suffer:
It cannot be fair to deprive a defendant of the ancient right to face his accuser because
a judge mixes some dubious generalizations about human behavior-such as that one is
unlikely to make a statement confessing a crime unless the entirety of the statement is
substantially true, or that brothers would not falsely incriminate each other-with his
own view of the surrounding facts to hinge on such cliches, but a defendant should have
the right to challenge his accuser in the courtroom when the out-of-court statement





some degree, could not circumvent the right to confrontation because
there were factors that may have led him to falsely accuse his brother
of the crime.2 66 The ACLU argued that it was not fair to deprive a
defendant of the right to face his accusers simply because of a judge's
preconceived notion of human behavior, such as the notion that
brothers would not falsely incriminate each other.267 The ACLU con-
tended that "hearsay exceptions may hinge on such cliches, but a de-
fendant should have the right to challenge his accuser in the
courtroom when the out-of-court statement falls within the perimeter
of core values on which the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation
rests. ' 268 The ACLU found that neither the "firmly rooted" test, nor
the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" test protected the
defendant or guaranteed the ancient right of confronting an accuser
"face to face," as protected by the Sixth Amendment. 269
The testimonial view and the prosecutorial restraint method are the
two categorical approaches that the ACLU advocated as best repre-
senting the true nature and function of the Confrontation Clause. 270
The use of the categorical approach is tantamount to applying a bright
line rule to confrontation analysis. 271 If the accused does not have the
opportunity to confront the witness, the issue of whether the witness is
unavailable, as proscribed in the testimonial view, is not a concern and
the statement is not admissible. 272
There are a few exceptions to the categorical approach. If the ac-
cused caused the unavailability of the witness, the confrontation right
is forfeited.273 Additionally, if the witness dies prior to testifying, the
266. Id. at 19.
267. Id. The ACLU noted that corroborating evidence would not help authenticate the state-
ment because the trial court's discretion would be unlimited, corroborating evidence is itself
highly unreliable and the Confrontation Clause analysis would turn into the question of whether
the judge thinks the defendant is guilty. Id. at 20 & n.35. See also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805,
822 (1990) (rejecting the idea that "evidence corroborating the truth of a hearsay statement may
properly support a finding that the statement bears 'particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness'").
268. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 19-20.
269. Id. at 20.
270. Id. at 20-25.
271. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 21.
272. Id. at 21 & n.36.
273. Id. at 21. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 39, at 1035 (finding that, in a very narrow quali-
fication, confrontation rights may depend on whomever causes the unavailability of a declarant);
United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272-74 (2d Cir. 1982) (allowing grand jury testimony
admitted at trial because accused had knowledge of plan to kill witness and did not warn). Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) is an exception to the rule against hearsay when the accused
caused the unavailability of the witness or "has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was
intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness." FED. R. EviD.
804(b)(5).
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prosecution could argue that there was no way of anticipating that the
witness would die suddenly or naturally, and thus provide the accused
the ability to confront the witness beforehand. 274 However, this ex-
ception would only arise under the testimonial approach, a person is
considered a witness under the Confrontation Clause only if their
statement was testimonial in nature. 275 It is necessary to include as
testimonial those statements that are made to authorities informally,
that is without a formal oath or without containment in "formalized
testimonial materials," but with knowledge that they will be used at
trial.276 This would protect the integrity of the Confrontation Clause,
as well as the accused, because authorities attempting to elicit state-
ments out of the reach of the Confrontation Clause, through the use
of informal means would be stymied by use of statements at trial that
were elicited even though the witness was not under oath.277
Under the prosecutorial restraint method, the only bar to the ad-
missibility of a statement is whether it was made to a government
agent.278 However, if the unavailability of a witness occurs through
the fault of the prosecutor, or falls under a claim of privilege, as in the
Lilly case, the state should bear the risk of the declarant becoming
unavailable.279 The presumption is that the prosecution can take
274. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 28 & n.47. The ACLU argued that "the prose-
cution rather than the accused should bear the risk that the declarant will later become unavaila-
ble. The prosecution could presumably have protected itself and preserved the defendant's
confrontation right by taking the declarant's deposition, except perhaps in those cases where the
death unexpectedly occurs." Id.
275. See Friedman, supra note 39, at 1039 (finding that whether or not a witness' statement is
testimonial depends largely on the procedural rules utilized in the legal system because those
rules will determine how the statement is used).
276. See Berger, supra note 10, at 607 (stating that "[u]nder a prosecutorial restraint model,
statements elicited by the prosecution and admissible pursuant to hearsay exceptions would have
to be reanalyzed to determine conformity with the Confrontation Clause").
277. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 28 & n.47. The ACLU commented that in a
case where there is an asserted claim of privilege "all the cards are in the state's hands. It could
try the witness first; it could strike a plea bargain; it could grant use immunity. If the state
refuses to play any of those cards, it-not the accused-should pay the price of that refusal." Id.
See also Friedman, supra note 39, at 1032 (finding that unavailability is "a complex factor in the
jurisprudence of the Confrontation Clause").
278. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 28.
279. See Friedman, supra note 39, at 1032-33 & n.102 (citing Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407 (finding
that the right of confrontation was violated where a testimonial statement was admitted without
giving the accused adequate opportunity to cross-examine)). However, Professor Friedman
found that there might be tactical reasons that a prior opportunity to cross-examine does not
yield an adequate opportunity to cross-examine as the Confrontation Clause anticipates. Id. at
1033 n.103-04 (citing Green, 399 U.S. at 164-66 (holding that a preliminary hearing provided an
ample opportunity for accused to examine the witness): Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719. 722 (1968)
(noting that in circumstances where defendant has cross-examined a declarant at a prior judicial
proceeding the requirement of confrontation was satisfied)).
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steps, such as depositions, to preserve the defendant's rights.280 If the
witness becomes unavailable, and the accused had the opportunity to
examine the witness under oath before trial, but did not take advan-
tage of this opportunity, this should not preclude admission of the
statement into evidence. 28 1
It then follows that statements made by a witness who testified at a
grand jury proceeding should not be admissible unless the defendant
was allowed to confront the witness. 282
In Lilly, Mark Lilly's statements clearly came under the testimonial
view. 283 Authorities elicited his statements for the purpose of using
them at trial, and they were testimonial in nature. Thus, he was a wit-
ness as defined by the Confrontation Clause. 284 Hence, if there was
no right to confrontation between the accused, Ben Lilly, and his
brother then the statements were inadmissible. 285 The ACLU argued
that Mark Lilly's statement was similarly inadmissible under the
prosecutorial restraint model. 286 As mentioned earlier, the key ques-
tion under this model turned on whether the government participated
in soliciting the statement from the declarant, and if so, then the Con-
frontation Clause demands that the defendant have the right to con-
front his accuser. 287
280. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 22. The ACLU noted that this would "elimi-
nate the current practice of subjecting grand jury statements to a 'particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness' analysis when they are offered under a residual hearsay exception." Id. at 22 &
n.37 (citing United States v. Gomez-Lemos, 939 F.2d 326, 332-33 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Wright,
497 U.S. at 816)).
281. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 22-23. See Friedman, supra note 39, at 1038-43.
Professor Friedman suggests a hypothetical to dramatize the effect of not including less-formal-
ized statements as fodder for confrontation rights:
A woman tells a counselor at a private shelter that she has been raped. The counselor
says:
Please make a statement for us. We will videotape it and send the tape to the prosecu-
tor. I anticipate that the prosecutor's office will use it at trial as the cornerstone of its
case against your assailant. The prosecutor won't have to call you as a witness, because
that's just not necessary any more .... The accused might call you-but only if he
dares, and only if you're then available. Which, so far as the law is concerned, you
needn't be. Oh, and by the way, since you're not speaking under oath, don't worry
about the prosecutor going after you for perjury.
Id. at 1041.
282. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 22-23.
283. Id. at 23.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 23-25; see generally Roger W. Kirst, The Procedural Dimensions of Confrontation
Doctrine, 66 NEB. L. REv 485 (1987) (establishing a prosecutorial structure for confrontation
doctrine that eliminates confusion among courts, practitioners, and commentators).
287. See Berger, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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Under this approach, confrontation protects the defendant against
statements that the government might elicit through its enormous
power to coerce or induce. If confrontation is not required, the gov-
ernment has the huge advantage of choosing whether to offer the
contents of the statement through the testimony of the often dis-
creditable declarant, or through the testimony of a presumptively
upright person involved in law enforcement. 288
The ACLU noted that there was no requirement under this ap-
proach to exempt all other hearsay from Confrontation Clause analy-
sis, as this approach was "responsive to the Bill of Rights' concern
with restraining the might of the government; other objectives of the
Bill of Rights and the Sixth Amendment support restrictions on hear-
say even though the government played no role in its creation. '289 In
Lilly, if Mark Lilly's interrogation and ultimate confession to police
was admitted into evidence without Mark having to appear under
oath in open court, it is clear that under a prosecutorial restraint
model that the admission was a violation of Ben Lilly's right to
confrontation.290
These two approaches, endorsed by the ACLU, do have limita-
tions.291 However, given the amorphous nature of the Confrontation
Clause as it stands today, and its relegation to simply another hearsay
exception, the categorical approach provides a more objective method
to analyze the rights of the accused under the Confrontation Clause.
2. Possible Weaknesses in Adopting a Categorical Approach
The first problem with a categorical approach stems from the fact
that both the testimonial view and prosecutorial restraint method es-
chew a reliability standard. The absence of a reliability factor to de-
termine the admissibility of a statement under the Confrontation
Clause is a "double-edged sword. '292
On the one hand, if the statement is not testimonial, so that the
declarant should not be deemed to have been acting as a witness in
288. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 24.
289. See Berger, supra note 10, at 563. Professor Berger found that Justice Thomas would
endorse, through his analysis, the exemption of other hearsay. Id. Professor Berger contended
that her article focused on the circumstances in which the statement was obtained and did not
"draw distinctions based on the form in which the statement was memorialized." Id. at 564. She
noted that Justice Thomas stated, in White v. Illinois, that applying the Confrontation Clause to
statements made in the anticipation of legal proceedings, similar to the approach of Professor
Friedman, would "entangle the courts in a multitude of difficulties." Id. at 563-64 n.30 (citing
White, 502 U.S. at 364 (Thomas, J. concurring)).
290. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 24.
291. See infra notes 292-320 and accompanying text.
292. See Friedman, supra note 39, at 1029 (positing that a reliability standard "is immune to
effective appellate monitoring").
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making it, the Clause should not bar its admissibility, even if the
statement does not seem reliable. On the other hand, if the state-
ment is testimonial, so that the declarant was acting as a witness in
making it, then the Clause should bar its admission unless it was
made or reaffirmed in the manner appropriate for testimony, sub-
ject to oath and cross-examination. 293
While the absence of a reliability factor as a criterion for analysis
under the Confrontation Clause may be a "double-edged" sword, reli-
ability itself is very difficult to determine. 294 "[E]vidence that is not
particularly reliable can be very helpful to the truth determination
process.., the paradigm of acceptable evidence-live testimony given
under oath and subject to cross-examination-is not particularly relia-
ble; if it were, conflicting testimony would not be such a common as-
pect of trials. '295
Another potential problem, concerning the testimonial approach, is
the subjective mindset of witnesses deemed to have made a testimo-
nial statement.296 The extension of the word "witnesses" to include
those statements made informally, but with the knowledge that the
statements are to be used as testimony, requires difficult factual deter-
minations.297 Most cases involve difficult factual determinations,
which are "a familiar, and tolerable, problem in protecting a funda-
mental right. ' 298 In fact, it has been ascertained that almost all rules of
law require difficult determinations and for the most part cases involv-
ing the Confrontation Clause would not involve a question of testimo-
293. Id. Professor Friedman felt that this analysis helped justify the outcome in Lee v. Illinois.
Id. The problem, according to Professor Friedman, was not that the statement in that case was
unreliable, in fact, it was probably very reliable considering its self-inculpatory content. Id. The
problem was that the statement was not made under oath or during cross-examination and was
tantamount to testimony against Lee. Id. Professor Friedman addressed the issue of a statement
so unlikely to be true that it has little probative value. Id. at 1029 n.90. He felt that such a
statement should be excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 403. Id. He also directed the
reader to another article he authored, Prior Statements of a Witness: A Nettlesome Corner of the
Hearsay Thicket, 1995 Sui,. CT. REV. 277, 309. which addressed the situation concerning a wit-
ness reaffirming at trial a prior statement. Id. at 1029 n.91.
294. Friedman, supra note 39, at 1027. See also Richard D. Friedman, Truth and Its Rivals in
the Law of Hearsay and Confrontation, 49 HASTINc.s L.J. 545, 563-64 (1998) (looking at truth
and its place in hearsay and confrontation analysis).
295. Friedman, supra note 39, at 1028.
296. For an answer to Professor Friedman's extension of the word "witnesses," see Akhil
Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 86 GEo. L.J.
1045. 1050 (1998).
297. See Friedman, supra note 39, at 1042. Professor Friedman acknowledged that his exten-
sion of the word "witnesses" is beyond what Justice Thomas and Professor Amar would include
under confrontation analysis. Id. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
298. Friedman, supra note 39, at 1043.
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nial intent. 299 A broader definition of the term "witnesses" ensures
that witnesses will not avoid confrontation by testifying informally.300
A problem with choosing only one approach is that certain state-
ments may avoid Confrontation Clause analysis, while others may fall
directly in its path.3° 1 For instance, a statement elicited by an under-
cover government agent, and admitted as testimony, unbeknownst to
the declarant, would fall within the prosecutorial restraint model and
require the right of confrontation. 30 2 However, the same statement
may not fall within the ambit of the Confrontation Clause under the
testimonial view because the statement was not made with the intent
that it be used in a forthcoming trial or against the accused. 3°3 None-
theless, since the government elicited the response by deliberately
concealing their identity, and used the statement in the investigation
or trial, it is conceivable that the declarant was acting as a witness. 304
Otherwise, the government could utilize trickery to elicit statements
from declarants, such as deliberately concealing their identity in order
to avoid reproducing the declarant at a trial. With the use of trickery,
the government is able to circumvent the Confrontation Clause, thus
denying the accused his fundamental right to confront the witnesses
against him.
The cases concerning children and the right to confrontation also
involve sensitive issues. 30 5 In applying the two approaches, different
methods have been adopted in order to manage the special circum-
299. See Friedman, supra note 39, at 1042-43. Professor Friedman interjected a few rules of
thumb when trying to ascertain whether a statement is testimonial:
A statement made knowingly to the authorities that describes criminal activity is almost
always testimonial. A statement made by a person claiming to be the victim of a crime
and describing the crime is usually testimonial, whether made to the authorities or not.
If, in the case of a crime committed over a short period of time, a statement is made
before the crime is committed, it almost certainly is not testimonial. A statement made
by one participant in a criminal enterprise to another, intended to further the enter-
prise, is not testimonial. And neither is a statement made in the course of going about
one's ordinary business, made before the criminal act has occurred or with no recogni-
tion that it relates to criminal activity.
Id.
300. Friedman, supra note 39, at 1043.
301. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 24 & n.40.
302. Id.
303. See Friedman, supra note 39, at 1039. Professor Friedman would find that since the de-
clarant did not know that her statement was elicited to be used at trial, the declarant did not
have the requisite intent for the statement to be considered testimonial. Id.
304. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71. at 24 & n.40. The ACLU did not reach the prob-
lem of whether the statement was testimonial, since Mark Lilly's statement was clearly not in
this category. Id. However, since the prosecution deliberately elicited the response from Mark,
for use in an investigation or trial, the statement was clearly testimonial.
305. Id. at 26 & n.44.
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stances surrounding children and their testimony.30 6 For example, the
prosecutorial restraint method covers statements that are elicited
from children where a government agent participated in the coer-
cion.301 7 This approach cautions that there are several factors that re-
quire an extraordinary safeguard when dealing with out of court
statements by a child. These factors include: "The vulnerability of the
witness, the high potential for the witness's absence at trial, and the
pressures on the prosecutor to get a conviction . "308 Furthermore,
this approach advocates having a contemporaneous recording at the
time a child's statement is being taken by a prosecutor, and moreover,
not having the testimony admitted into evidence unless the recording
is available. 30 9 With this safeguard in place, the jury is assured of
hearing the child's testimony and not a paraphrased rendition. 3 1
Even if the government subsequently produces the child as a wit-
ness, the jury may find it extremely difficult to ascertain whether the
initial questioning of the child tainted her perception and memory.
When the child is so young that it is unlikely that he or she will
qualify as a witness, the interviewer knows that the statement elic-
ited will most probably constitute the chief evidence against the
accused. 311
The testimonial view, on the other hand, considers other factors
with regard to children.312 For example, under the testimonial view, a
very young child would not be considered a witness for Confrontation
Clause purposes because of her limited understanding.3 13 Moreover,
a child could be susceptible to intimidation, which may lead to a for-
feiture of the confrontation right by the accused under the testimonial
view.314 However, this view espouses that a child witness, if at all pos-
sible, be put on the stand if the child's statement is one to which the
right of confrontation should apply, so that the right is not defeated by
an invocation of a hearsay exception that admits the evidence into
court.31 5 In supporting this view, one commentator wrote,
306. Id. at 26.
307. See Berger, supra note 10, at 611-12 (finding that manipulation of a child declarant would
not be a problem for an over-aggressive interviewer).
3(18. Id. at 612.
309. Id.
310). Id.
311. Id. at 611.
312. See Friedman, supra note 70 at 531-535 (advocating an approach, concerning child declar-
ants, that would not require developing more exceptions to the rule against hearsay).
313. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 26 & n.44.
314. Id.
315. See Friedman, supra note 70, at 532. Professor Friedman listed several factors that weigh
in favor of having a child declarant testify: (1) child declarants are no more susceptible to trauma
and fear in the courtroom as adults; (2) available evidence suggests that testifying does not have
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I find disturbing an approach that says to the accused, in effect,
"Well, perhaps you have a fundamental right at stake here, but
someone else would be hurt if we allowed you to invoke it against
the state and yet insisted on prosecuting you [sic]. Perhaps it is too
late in this "age of balancing" to argue against such willingness to
balance away the rights of an accused against the state. But I prefer
viewing the accused's fundamental rights, at least at their core, as
truly fundamental and not subject to being balanced away.3 16
Finally, in evaluating the testimonial approach, there has been some
concern about prior testimony adequately meeting the confrontation
requirement, effectively preventing the witness from testifying again
at trial, regardless of availability. 31 7 According to a testimonial view,
this type of situation calls for fact specific exception. 318
In examining some of the differences and idiosyncrasies between
the categorical approaches, it is important to note that neither the tes-
timonial view, nor the prosecutorial restraint method, answers every
problem or solves every fact pattern neatly. 31 9 In some cases, a differ-
ence in outcome is inevitable. The importance of the categorical ap-
proach, as advocated by the ACLU, is the creation of a bright line rule
that is readily discernable to lower courts.320 Furthermore, this ap-
proach eliminates the amorphous and subjective nature of the general
approach enunciated by the Court in White, and followed by the
Court in Lilly. Therefore, if the categorical approach were used in
place of the Court's "reliability" analysis, the Confrontation Clause
would stand independent of the Rules of Evidence and the hearsay
doctrine. Furthermore, adoption of one of the categorical approaches
would not change the outcome of prior decisions of the Supreme
long-term traumatic effects; (3) if the child absolutely cannot testify, there are other means of
receiving her testimony then just doing away with her live testimony; (4) if caretakers are con-
cerned that the process will cause irreversible harm to the child, then the child has the option of
not testifying and that testimony not being offered against the defendant; and (5) balancing away
a defendant's fundamental right to confront the witnesses against him, because a child declarant
will not testify is too big a price for justice to pay. Id. at 532-33.
316. Id. at 533 (citations omitted).
317. See Friedman, supra note 39, at 1033 (noting that "our system has a general preference
that the witness testify live").
318. Friedman, supra note 39, at 1032-33. In fact, Professor Friedman addressed this concern
in his article. He found:
that a plausible argument supports the proposition that the prior opportunity to ex-
amine the witness satisfies the Clause: The accused has had the opportunity to "be
confronted with" the witness when the witness gave the testimony, and it is not clear
that the Clause requires that the confrontation be repeated at trial if that is possible.
Id. at 1033.
319. See Douglass, supra note 8, at 195 & n.15 (reciting a list commentators and their different
approaches to confrontation).
320. See Friedman, supra note 39, at 1042-43 (finding that "if a statement fell within the
Clause, the protection would, in a meaningful sense, be absolute").
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Court, but rather, it would provide a stable and easy rule of law for
the lower courts to follow.
V. THE EFFECT OF A CATEGORICAL APPROACH ON PAST
JURISPRUDENCE AND FUTURE COURT CASES
The ACLU's categorical view of the Confrontation Clause is consis-
tent with most of the Supreme Court's past decisions.32' The ACLU
has commented that "although the Court has not consciously articu-
lated our approach, its decisions have reflected the force of that ap-
proach. '322 Moreover, the ACLU has not suggested that all difficult
decisions could be easily decided under the categorical approach, but
rather, many of the cases the Court has grappled with in the past
would become more straightforward. 323 Further, future cases decided
under a categorical approach would not stray from the results reached
by the Court in past cases, yet the analysis would differ significantly; a
result lower courts might eagerly embrace.
The ACLU examined a number of cases to establish the premise
that past Supreme Court case decisions do not differ significantly
under a categorical approach. 32 4 First, the ACLU looked at Pointer v.
Texas,325 Douglas v. Alabama,326 and Lee v. Illinois.327 The ACLU
ascertained that in these three cases there were two common ele-
ments. 328 First, the declarant knowingly made a statement to govern-
ment agents concerning a criminal investigation. 329 Second, the
accused did not have an opportunity to confront the declarant. 330
321. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 25.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 25. The ACLU, in its brief, did not address all the possible problems that might
arise under the testimonial view or the prosecutorial restraint method. However, problems may
arise because the ACLU's approach focuses on when confrontation is necessary, not what is
required for confrontation. Id. at 25 & n.41. Problems that arise when a witness has a faulty
memory, as in United States v. Owens, or whether the accused and the witness must always be in
the same room for adequate confrontation protection, as in Maryland v. Craig and Coy v. Iowa,
were not addressed in the ACLU's brief. Id. These types of situations are unique and must first
follow the guidelines in either approach and then possibly take into account the specific facts of
each case; considering each case based on its facts is hardly a departure from routine jurispru-
dence for the Supreme Court. While not all answers may be clear what is clear, is that under the
approach advocated by the ACLU, the Supreme Court would eliminate a multitude of problems
and lower court confusion over the correct analysis.
324. Id. at 25-30.
325. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Note that in Pointer v. Texas, the Supreme Court made applicable to
the States the confrontation right through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 407-08.
326. 38) U.S. 415 (1965).
327. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
328. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 25.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 25-26.
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Under these facts, both the prosecutorial restraint model and the testi-
monial view would find that the declarant was a witness within the
meaning of the Confrontation Clause, and under either categorical ap-
proaches, there would be a violation of the accused's right to confron-
tation.331 More importantly, in Douglas and Lee, the accomplice
made a statement to police that the accused was not able to ade-
quately confront, a scenario similar to Lilly. Further, under a categor-
ical approach, Lilly would be decided in the same manner as Douglas
and Lee, thus, since the statement was made to a government official
and the accused did not have ample opportunity to confront the wit-
ness, the right of confrontation was violated. This type of analysis nar-
rows the debate on how the right to confrontation should be applied,
and gives a bright line test that is easy to apply and straightforward.
The ACLU contrasted the Pointer-Douglas-Lee line of cases with
Dutton v. Evans332 and United States v. Inadi.333 In these cases, the
declaration was not issued in a judicial proceeding or to a government
agent concerning a criminal investigation. 334 Thus, the ACLU con-
cluded that the statements were not within the realm of the Confron-
tation Clause, as defined by the testimonial view or the prosecutorial
restraint model. 335 In other words, although the statements at issue
fell under other rules of evidence, the statements were not subjected
to confrontation analysis because they did not fit under that analytical
framework. In Lilly, the extrajudicial statements made by Mark Lilly
were spoken to a law enforcement officer in the course of an interro-
gation. Those statements, therefore, do not fall under either Dutton
or Inadi because they are subject to confrontation analysis.
331. Id. at 26. In both Douglas and Lee, the alleged accomplice made a statement that the
accused did not have an adequate opportunity to confront. Id. at 25. This is the same scenario in
Lilly v. Virginia.
332. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
333. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
334. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 26.
335. The ACLU summarized these two cases as follows:
In Dutton, the statement was made by one prisoner to another. In Inadi, the state-
ments were made by one member of a conspiracy to another, without any inducement
by agents of the prosecution; they were not testifying but carrying on the ordinary busi-
ness of the conspiracy. Thus, in neither of these cases were the declarants acting as
witnesses when they made the statements in issue,
Id. at 26. Note, however, that even though confrontation may not be implicated, other hearsay
exceptions may come into play. This section of the Comment will focus on how a categorical




In still other cases, such as Mattox v. United States336 and California
v. Green,337 the accused had an opportunity to interview the witness
before trial.338 Using either categorical approach, the unavailability of
the witness, despite good faith efforts, does not preclude use of the
earlier testimony due to the prior opportunity to interview the wit-
ness.339 Since the prosecution made a good faith effort to secure the
attendance of a witness at trial, and the defendant had an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, the right to confrontation
was not violated. 340 In Lilly, the accused, Ben Lilly, had no opportu-
nity to cross-examine his brother concerning the statements made to
the police. At trial Mark Lilly had refused to testify, asserting his
Fifth Amendment right, yet the lower courts allowed the statements in
against his brother citing the "firmly rooted" against penal interest
hearsay exception. 34' Under either categorical approach, the lower
courts would not have let the statements into evidence because the
analysis would immediately have found a violation of the Confronta-
tion Clause when Ben Lilly did not have the opportunity to cross-
examine his brother concerning the statements elicited by the police.
In addition, the ACLU noted that if the Supreme Court had used a
categorical approach in Williamson v. United States,342 the analysis
would have led directly to a violation of the Confrontation Clause. 343
In Williamson, the accomplice confessed to police while implicating
the accused in the crimes. 344 The Court held that Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 804(b)(3) "does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory
statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is
336. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
337. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). In Green, the accused cross-examined the witness at a preliminary
hearing, but at trial the witness was uncooperative. Id. at 151-153.
338. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 27-28.
339. Id. at 28.
340. See Friedman, supra note 39, at 1032-34 (discussing prior statements made at preliminary
hearing or trial as sufficient to satisfy Confrontation Clause); see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S.
719, 724-25 (1968) (finding that a witness is not "unavailable," "unless the prosecutorial authori-
ties have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial;" in addition, the Court found
that the defendant did not waive his right of confrontation by not cross-examining the declarant
at a preliminary hearing); Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 216 (holding that there was adequate opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant at a prior trial and that the state's efforts to procure a declarant
that was living in a foreign country were satisfactory). The ACLU found that these holdings
were consistent with their categorical approach: "If the witness was unavailable at trial despite
good faith efforts, the Confrontation Clause should not preclude use of the earlier testimony."
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 27-28.
341. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 122.
342. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
343. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 29.
344. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 597-98.
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generally self-inculpatory. ' 345 While the Court found a violation of
the right to confrontation, the same result would be reached using a
categorical approach, albeit without the use of the rules of evidence
on hearsay. The witness made a confession to the police, thus, the
statement, under either the testimonial view or the prosecutorial re-
straint method, falls under the umbrella of confrontation analysis.
Therefore, the statement would have to be excluded, unless the ac-
cused had the right to confront his accuser. As a result, the use of a
categorical approach is more straightforward and does not involve the
hearsay rules in its determination. Moreover, the Court, in William-
son, narrowly construed the hearsay exception for declarations against
penal interest, causing the ACLU to state that "Williamson is thus a
good indication that the melding of the Confrontation Clause and of
hearsay doctrine tends not only to denigrate the constitutional protec-
tion, but also to make hearsay law unduly rigid. 346
Nonetheless, the Court in its decision in Lilly turned to the general
approach articulated in Ohio v. Roberts.347 In Lilly, there was a clear
violation of Ben Lilly's right to confrontation because statements
made by an accomplice to a government official, which the accused
had no opportunity to cross-examine, were admitted into evidence. 348
While the Court decided there was a violation of Ben Lilly's right to
confrontation, because the accomplice's confession was not suffi-
ciently reliable in order to be admitted without the opportunity for
cross-examination, the Court missed the opportunity to create a bright
line test to resolve the confrontation problem.
The question remains whether the Lilly opinion is a further dilution
of the Confrontation Clause or a narrowing of the hearsay doctrine.
The answer lies in the opinion itself. All nine Justices concurred in the
judgment; however, there were four separate opinions on how to ap-
proach the confrontation analysis.349 This is indicative of the convo-
luted status that still belies the Confrontation Clause, and the
difficulty lower courts will continue to have in deciding what hearsay
rule may trump the procedural right to confrontation. Therefore,
while taking a case to the Supreme Court may be one avenue to re-
solve differences in appellate court opinions concerning a right em-
bodied in the United States Constitution, the Lilly case did nothing to
345. Id. at 600-01.
346. Id. The ACLU suggested that the holding in Williamson was far more restrictive then
prior authorities contended. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 29. (citing 2 MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE 344-45 (4th ed. 1992)).
347. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 124-25.
348. See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
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resolve the confrontation-hearsay tension. The Supreme Court's plu-
rality opinion and ultimate decision on the method to tackle a Con-
frontation Clause question is far from solidified. Furthermore, five
members of the Court rejected the plurality's definition of a declara-
tion against penal interest.350
The right of confrontation must be recognized as a fundamental
part of a defendant's right to due process, just as the right to counsel
and the right to a trial by jury are considered part of the due process
rights. The impact of changing the analysis toward a categorical ap-
proach would result in more symmetry in the otherwise asymmetrical
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. In other words, the guess-
work courts currently use would disappear in Confrontation Clause
analysis. Cases could be decided with the same set of rules, predict-
ably and consistently, a benefit for both courts and legal practitioners
alike. Further, the Court would not have to delve into stare decisis by
changing their analysis, allowing future cases to be decided with con-
sistency. Simply put, the impact of such a change would necessarily
keep courts on the same page without having to define amorphous
terms such as "reliability" and "trustworthiness."
When looking at the Court's cyclical banter about an exception to
the hearsay rule being "trustworthy" or "reliable," based on the num-
ber of years it has been around, it seems ludicrous to base the right to
confrontation, on such a subjective category. The categorical ap-
proach advocated in this Comment eliminates guess-work from the
analysis process. However, the Supreme Court may not have perma-
nently put Confrontation Clause analysis to rest since Justice Breyer,
in Lilly, acknowledged that the approach advocated by the ACLU was
not lost on deaf ears, thus keeping the door open for a revision of
confrontation analysis that utilizes a categorical approach.3 5'
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment is but one road concerning confrontation-hearsay
analysis that the Supreme Court could travel down. It is important,
however, that the road less traveled be taken. Ultimately, the Su-
preme Court needs to write an opinion that is authoritative on the
350. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. See also Daniel J. Capra, Out-Of-Court State-
ments and the Confrontation Clause, N.Y.L.J, July 9, 1999, at 3, 4 (stating that the analysis in
Williamson v. United States is more authoritative on the subject of declarations against penal
interest then the plurality opinion in Lilly).
351. Lilly, 527 U.S. 142-43 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer stated "I write separately
to point out that the fact [that] we do not reevaluate the link Ibetween confrontation and hear-
say] in this case does not end the matter. It may leave the question open for another day." Id.
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right to confrontation, only then will the application of the Confronta-
tion Clause in courts across the country become consistent. In addi-
tion, the constitutional right of confrontation, along with the
defendants it protects, will no longer suffer the consequences of being
judged a rule of evidence instead of a procedural right.
The right of confrontation is both procedural and fundamental. The
foregoing analysis provided alternative means by which the Court can
evaluate cases without turning confrontation into a rule of evidence.
It is important that the Sixth Amendment retain its original purpose,
to give the accused the right to confront "the witnesses against
him. ' 352 Otherwise, adequate protection will not be within the ac-
cused's reach, lower courts will continue to be flummoxed by Supreme
Court decisions on the issue, and effective appellate review will be
impossible because of amorphous decisions by the Court. 353 A cate-
gorical approach would provide a rule that is easy to follow and does
not use subjective criteria such as "reliability" and "guarantees of
trustworthiness." Furthermore, the categorical approach will return
the Confrontation Clause to its original meaning and historical roots
in the Bill of Rights:
The Court will, we believe, continue to make decisions that reflect
the demands of the confrontation right, because that right is such a
fundamental, and intuitively appealing, aspect of civilized jurispru-
dence. But, if it continues to use hearsay law as the vehicle for
those decisions, it will be unable to articulate either a robust under-
standing of the constitutional right or a sensible, truth-oriented,
doctrine of hearsay. 354
Finally, a categorical approach to the Confrontation Clause is not
only logical, but more importantly, necessary to save the right to con-
352. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
353. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 29-30. In concluding their amicus brief, the
ACLU stated:
The Court could reach the proper result in this case without revisiting its approach to
the Confrontation Clause. But to do so would just be to put one more patch on a
tattered garment. It would leave lower courts perplexed on how to apply the Clause,
because there would still be no constant guide to the Court's decisions. It would con-
tinue to make effective appellate review impractical, because decisions would still de-
pend so heavily on analysis of the evidence in the particular case. It would require
continuing reliance on hearsay doctrine to do the work that should be performed by the
Confrontation Clause-to the detriment of both. It would mean that the Court's stated
grounds of decision lack persuasive power. And it would miss out on the great princi-
ple underlying the Clause, one integral to the Sixth Amendment and with roots booth
[sic] deep and broad: When the government prosecutes an accused, the accused has a
categorical right to confront "the witnesses against him."
Id.
354. Id. at 29.
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frontation and untangle the web of confrontation-hearsay analysis
that is currently plaguing the courts.
Natalie Kijurna
